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TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS IN CANADA:
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND REFORM©
BY DAVID G. DUFF*
Tax recognition for charitable contributions in
Canada takes the form of a deduction where the
contribution is made by a corporation or for the purpose
of gaining or producing income from a business, a nonrefundable credit where individuals make qualifying gifts
to eligible recipients, and a reduction or exemption from
capital gains tax on gifts to eligible recipients of
qualifying cultural property, publicly traded securities, or
ecologically sensitive land. This article reviews different
rationales for the tax recognition of charitable
contributions, concluding that the most persuasive
rationale is to indirectly subsidize the quasi-public goods
and services that charities provide and the social and
cultural pluralism that they advance. The article goes on
to evaluate current rules by reference to these rationales
for tax recognition and makes specific proposals for
reforming Canadian tax rules in light of this evaluation.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The recognition of charitable contributions under the income tax
scheme is generally justified on one of three grounds: to obtain an accurate
measure of the donor’s income that is subject to tax, to reward the donor’s
generosity, or to provide an indirect subsidy to eligible recipients by
encouraging charitable donations. While the first of these rationales
suggests that tax recognition should take the form of a deduction in
computing net or taxable income, the implications of the other rationales
are less obvious.
In Canada, tax recognition for contributions to charitable
©
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organizations takes four separate forms. First, where a charitable
contribution is made for the purpose of gaining or producing income from
a business, Canadian courts have held that the amount of the donation is
deductible under general rules governing the computation of the donor’s
net income from the business.1 Second, where a corporation makes a
qualifying gift to an eligible recipient, the corporation may deduct the fair
market value of the gift in computing its taxable income either in the year
of the gift or in any one of the five subsequent taxation years, subject to a
limit expressed as a percentage of the corporation’s income for the year.2
Third, where an individual makes a qualifying gift to an eligible recipient,
the individual may claim a non-refundable credit against basic income tax
otherwise payable, the amount of which is computed as a percentage of the
aggregate fair market value of all such gifts made during the year or in any
of the preceding five years, also subject to a limit expressed as a percentage
of the individual’s income for the year.3 Finally, where property donated to
an eligible recipient is qualifying cultural property, publicly traded
securities, or ecologically sensitive land, special rules reduce or eliminate
the capital gains tax that would otherwise be payable if this property had
appreciated in value prior to the making of the gift.4 As a result, the
Canadian income tax recognizes contributions to charitable organizations
through a deduction in some circumstances, a non-refundable credit in
others, and a full or partial exemption from capital gains tax otherwise
payable on gifts of certain kinds of appreciated property.
This article discusses the tax treatment of charitable contributions
in Canada, evaluating each of these approaches by reference to what I
1

See Olympia Floor & Wall Tile (Quebec) Ltd. v. MNR, [1970] Ex. C.R. 274; Impenco Ltd. v. M.N.R.
(1988), 88 D.T.C. 1242 (T.C.C.).
2

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.1, s. 110.1 [Act]. As a general rule, the annual ceiling
on deductible gifts is three-quarters of the corporation’s income for the year. This limit is increased
where the corporation is subject to capital gains or recaptured depreciation on donations of capital
property and does not apply to gifts of cultural property, ecological gifts, or gifts to the Crown.
3

The federal credit, on which provincial credits are based, appears in section 118.1 of the Act. As
with the deduction for corporate donations, the limit on the aggregate fair market value of gifts that may
be claimed in a taxation year is generally three-quarters of the individual’s income for the year, but it
is increased where the individual is subject to capital gains or recaptured depreciation on donations of
capital property and it does not apply to gifts of cultural property, ecological gifts, or gifts to the Crown.
4

Act, supra note 2, s. 39(1)(a)(i.1), which exempts any capital gain on gifts of property that the
Canadian Cultural Property Export Review Board determines meets the criteria set out in the Cultural
Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-51, ss. 29(3)(b) and (c), provided that the donation is
made to an institution or public authority designated under s. 32(2) of that act; s. 38(a)(1), which
reduces the inclusion rate on gifts of publicly traded securities from one-half to one-quarter; and s.
38(a)(2), which reduces the inclusion rate on gifts of ecologically sensitive land from one-half to onequarter.
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contend to be the most persuasive rationales for tax recognition and
recommending specific reforms to the current statutory scheme. Part II
considers different rationales for, and approaches to, the tax recognition of
charitable contributions, concluding that such recognition may be justified
both where donations are made for the purpose of gaining or producing
income and as a way of subsidizing the quasi-public goods and services
provided by charitable organizations and the social and cultural pluralism
advanced by these organizations. Part III picks up on the second of these
rationales, reviewing current statutory rules and judicial decisions
governing eligible recipients, qualifying gifts, and different methods of tax
recognition. Part IV recommends specific reforms to the current statutory
scheme in light of the theoretical approach advanced in Part II. Part V
provides a brief conclusion.
II.

THEORY: RATIONALES FOR TAX RECOGNITION OF
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS

Tax recognition of charitable contributions is generally favoured on
one of three grounds: to obtain an accurate measure of the donor’s taxable
income, to reward the donor’s generosity, or to provide an indirect subsidy
to charitable organizations by encouraging donations. The following
discussion evaluates each of these rationales and their implications for the
manner in which charitable contributions should be recognized for tax
purposes.5 Rejecting the view that tax recognition is necessary to measure
taxable income or to reward generosity, I argue that such recognition is best
justified as an indirect subsidy for the quasi-public goods and services
provided by the charitable sector.
A.

Measuring Taxable Income

The accurate measurement of taxable income is a question of
horizontal equity, a basic principle of tax fairness according to which
taxpayers who are similarly situated should pay similar amounts in tax.
While the concept of horizontal equity affirms the principle of formal
equality, the determination of whether two or more taxpayers are similarly
situated for the purpose of an income tax depends on a substantive
conception of the ideal tax base. Since the definition of this base involves
5

Parts of this discussion are based on David G. Duff, “Charitable Contributions and the Personal
Income Tax: Evaluating the Canadian Credit” in Jim Phillips, Bruce Chapman & David Stevens, eds.,
Between State and Market: Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2001) 407 at 426-36 [Duff, “Charitable Contributions”].
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inclusions and deductions, the characterization of a measurement of taxable
income as accurate turns on the specification of appropriate inclusions and
deductions.
As a general rule, those favouring the taxation of income, as
opposed to personal consumption, have preferred an expansive concept of
appropriate inclusions in order to ensure that the income tax applies to a
broad measure of each taxpayer’s ability to pay.6 According to Robert
Haig, for example, the definition of taxable income should include “the
money value of the net accretion to one’s economic power between two
points of time.”7 Similarly, suggesting that income “connotes, broadly, the
exercise of control over the use of society’s scarce resources,” Henry
Simons proposed that taxable income should include “(1) the market value
of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question.”8
Theoretical approaches differ with respect to appropriate
deductions.9 Although most conceptions of horizontal equity accept the
legitimacy of deductions for reasonable expenses incurred by taxpayers for
the purpose of producing taxable income,10 opinion is divided on the extent
to which personal expenses should be deductible in computing taxable
income. While many tax theorists favour the deduction of non-discretionary
personal expenses as necessary adjustments to measure each taxpayer’s
ability to pay,11 others reject the deduction of all personal expenses on the
6

See e.g. Robert Murray Haig, “The Concept of Income – Economic and Legal Aspects” in
Robert Murray Haig, ed., The Federal Income Tax (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921) 27;
Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938); R.A. Musgrave, “In Defense of an Income Concept”
(1967) 81 Harv. L. Rev. 44; and Victor Thuronyi, “The Concept of Income” (1990) 46 Tax L. Rev. 45.
For a more critical view see Boris I. Bittker, “A ‘Comprehensive Tax Base’ as a Goal of Income Tax
Reform” (1967) 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925.
7
8

Haig, ibid. at 59 [emphasis omitted].
Simons, supra note 6 at 50.

9

For an excellent discussion of different approaches, see Tim Edgar, “The Concept of Taxable
Consumption and the Deductibility of Expenses Under an Ideal Personal Income Tax Base” in Richard
Krever, ed., Tax Conversations: A Guide to the Key Issues in the Tax Reform Debate (London: Kluwer Law
International, 1997) 293.
10

See e.g. Richard Goode, The Individual Income Tax, rev. ed. (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1976) at 75; Wayne R. Thirsk, “Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: The Choice Between
Credits and Deductions Under the Individual Income Tax in Canada” (1980) 28 Can. Tax J. 32 at 33.
11

See e.g. Pierre Cloutier & Bernard Fortin, “Converting Exemptions and Deductions into
Credits: An Economic Assessment” in Jack Mintz & John Whalley, eds., The Economic Impacts of Tax
Reform (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989) 45 at 54-62; Robin W. Boadway & Harry M.
Kitchen, Canadian Tax Policy, 3d ed. (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999) at 131.
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grounds that they are discretionary or otherwise irrelevant to the
appropriate definition of taxable income12 or inferior to other policy
instruments as a way of subsidizing these expenses.13 Adopting an
altogether different approach, William Andrews has relied on Simons’
definition of personal income as the sum of personal consumption and
savings to advance an alternative conception of taxable income, according
to which deductions would be allowed for all expenditures not amounting
to personal consumption or savings.14
Elsewhere, I have questioned Andrews’ concept of taxable income15
and favoured a concept of horizontal equity that allows deductions for nondiscretionary expenses.16 Although Andrews’ approach might be
appropriate for a tax on personal consumption,17 it contradicts what I
regard as the key purpose of an income tax: to impose a social claim on a
share of each taxpayer’s annual gains from participation in the market
economy.18 While the latter approach is consistent with the denial of any
deduction for personal expenses, it is my view that attention to differences
12

See e.g. Neil Brooks, “Comments on the Paper by Robin W. Boadway and Harry M. Kitchen”
(1999) 47 Can. Tax J. 608 (“One of the most fundamental principles underlying a fair tax system is that
business expenses are deductible and personal expenses are not” at 621.) See also Neil Brooks, “The
Irrelevance of Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability” in John G. Head & Richard Krever,
Tax Units and the Rate Scale (Melbourne: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1996) 35.
13

See e.g. National Council on Welfare, The Hidden Welfare System (Ottawa: National Council
on Welfare, 1976) (regarding these deductions as “upside-down” subsidies worth more to high-income
taxpayers than low-income taxpayers, at 16-19). Implicit in this critique, though generally not
acknowledged, is an assumption about the appropriate tax base, by reference to which deductions for
personal expenses are characterized as subsidies.
14

William D. Andrews, “Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax” (1972) 86 Harv. L. Rev.

309.
15

Duff, “Charitable Contributions”, supra note 5 at 427-28.

16

See David G. Duff, “Disability and the Income Tax” (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 797 [Duff,
“Disability”]; and David G. Duff, “Tax Policy and the Family: A North American Comparison” in
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the Foundation for Fiscal Studies (Dublin: Foundation
for Fiscal Studies, 2000) 36 [Duff, “Tax Policy and the Family”].
17

See e.g. William D. Andrews, “A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax”
(1974) 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113.
18

For an excellent statement of this concept, see Alvin Warren, “Would a Consumption Tax be
Fairer than an Income Tax?” (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 1081 (arguing, among other things, that “a producer
does not have a controlling moral claim over the product of his capital and labor, given the role of
fortuity in income distribution and the dependence of producers on consumers and other producers to
create value in our society—factors that create a general moral claim on all private product on behalf
of the entire society” at 1090-93). See also Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., “Rawls, Justice, and the Income
Tax” (1981) 16 Ga. L. Rev. 1; and David G. Duff, “Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical
Argument” (1993) 6 Can. J.L. & Jur. 3 (discussing competing claims of individual and social desert
within a liberal-egalitarian conception of distributive justice at 54-56).
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in taxpayers’ personal circumstances favours deductions for nondiscretionary expenses such as the costs of basic subsistence, family
obligations, or necessary medical care.19
From this perspective on the appropriate tax base, one can evaluate
alternative arguments that tax recognition for charitable contributions is
necessary to obtain an accurate measure of the donor’s taxable income.
Although this rationale implies that such recognition should take the form
of a deduction, the concept of taxable income advanced in the previous
paragraph rejects Andrews’ view that charitable gifts that do not enter into
the donor’s personal consumption ought to be deductible in computing the
donor’s income.20 On the contrary, to the extent that the donor is legally
entitled to the income from which the charitable contribution is made, the
concept of income as the taxpayer’s share of social output suggests that the
amount of the donation should be included in computing the donor’s
income.21 Similarly, while the concept of income proposed in the previous
paragraph would permit a deduction for non-discretionary personal
expenses, it is difficult to regard charitable contributions as nondiscretionary in the same way as the costs of basic subsistence, family
obligations, or necessary medical care. Instead, notwithstanding Boris
Bittker’s argument that “charitable contributions represent a claim of such
a high priority” that they should be excluded “in determining the amount
of income at the voluntary disposal of the taxpayer in question,”22
charitable gifts are best characterized as a discretionary form of personal
expenditure not unlike other consumption expenses which are not
deductible in computing a taxpayer’s income.23 In contrast, where a
19
20

See Duff, “Disability,” supra note 16; and Duff, “Tax Policy and the Family,” supra note 16.
Supra note 14 at 317-31.

21

For similar responses to Andrew’s view, see Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The
Concept of Tax Expenditures (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973) at 20-21; Rick Krever,
“Tax Deductions for Charitable Donations: A Tax Expenditure Analysis” in Richard Krever &
Gretchen Kewley, eds., Charities and Philanthropic Institutions: Reforming the Tax Subsidy and Regulatory
Regimes (Melbourne: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1991) 1 at 5-8.
22

Boris I. Bittker, “The Propriety and Vitality of a Federal Income Tax Deduction for Private
Philanthropy” in Tax Impacts on Philanthropy. Symposium conducted by the Tax Institute of America,
December 2-3, 1971 (Princeton: Tax Institute of America, 1972) 145 at 165 [Bittker, “Propriety”]. For
a similar argument see also Mark P. Gergen, “The Case for a Charitable Contribution Deduction”
(1988) 74 Va. L. Rev. 1393 at 1426-33.
23

See e.g. Gwyneth McGregor, “Charitable Contributions” (1961) 9 Can. Tax J. 441 (“Charitable
contributions ... are not a vital necessity of life and are voluntary” at 442); Edward H. Rabin,
“Charitable Trusts and Charitable Deductions” (1966) 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 912 (“the charitable deduction
exists almost solely to encourage charitable giving, not to relieve hardship caused by ‘involuntary’
expenses” at 915); James A. Rendall, “Taxation of Contributors to Charitable Organizations Under the
Income Tax Act” in Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Tax Conference. November 19-21, 1973
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taxpayer donates cash or property to a charitable organization for the
purpose of earning income, this donation is properly deductible in
computing the taxpayer’s income as an ordinary business expense.
B.

Rewarding Generosity

As an alternative to the accurate measurement of income rationale,
tax recognition for charitable contributions is also favoured on the basis
that it rewards generosity as a form of virtuous behaviour. For example,
Bittker suggests, in addition to other arguments for a charitable deduction,
that “something can be said for rewarding activities that in a certain sense
are selfless, even if the reward serves no incentive function.”24 Similarly,
Richard Goode has referred to the U.S. deduction for charitable
contributions as a “reward” for charitable giving.25
As a reward for the donor’s generosity, tax recognition for
charitable contributions should logically take the form of a tax benefit, the
value of which is geared in some way to a measure of the donor’s relative
sacrifice.26 Given statistics indicating that low-income donors tend to give
a larger percentage of their incomes to charities than high-income donors,27
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1974) 152 (characterizing charitable contributions as
“consumption” at 153); Boadway & Kitchen, supra note 11 (contrasting medical expenses, which are
almost always involuntary, with charitable donations, which “are not a vital necessity of life and tend
to be made on a voluntary basis” at 133); and Ellen P. Aprill, “Churches, Politics, and the Charitable
Contribution Deduction” (2001) 42 B.C.L. Rev. 843 (“charitable contributions are made voluntarily,
as a discretionary use of income”at 870).
24
25

Bittker, “Propriety”, supra note 22 at 166.
Supra note 10 at 165.

26

See e.g. Paul R. McDaniel, “Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Deductions: A Substitute
for the Income Tax Deduction” (1972) 27 Tax L. Rev. 377 (“if there is to be a reward for charitable
giving, the incidence and amount of the reward should bear some rational relationship to the act of
charitable giving. The reward should be the same for persons who make a similar sacrifice, however
measured” at 394).
27

See e.g. Richard M. Bird & Meyer W. Bucovetsky, Canadian Tax Reform and Private
Philanthropy, Tax Paper No. 58 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1976) (reporting for the 1972
taxation year that for taxpayers claiming charitable contributions, the percentage of average income
among different income groups was 7.8 per cent for donors with incomes less than $5,000, 4.1 per cent
for donors with incomes of $5,000 to $10,000, 2.9 per cent for donors with incomes of $10,000 to
$20,000, 2.4 per cent for donors with incomes of $20,000 to $50,000, 2.4 per cent for donors with
incomes of $50,000 to $100,000, and 3.6 per cent for donors with incomes exceeding $100,000 at 18
(Table 18)). More recent figures from the 1990 taxation year, demonstrate a similar U-shaped ratio of
charitable donations to income level of donors, falling from 4.1 per cent for donors with taxable incomes
less than $10,000 to 2.1 per cent for donors with taxable incomes of $10,000 to $30,000, 1.4 per cent for
donors with taxable incomes of $30,000 to $50,000, 1.3 per cent for donors with taxable incomes of
$50,000 to $100,000, 1.7 per cent for donors with taxable incomes of $100,000 to $250,000, and 1.9 per
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this rationale for tax recognition suggests that a deduction, the value of
which increases as the donor’s income increases, has the reward structure
backwards. Instead, assuming a diminishing marginal utility of income, one
might favour a benefit that decreases as the donor’s income increases. Neil
Brooks, for example, has suggested that a tax credit for charitable
contributions “could be set at 30 per cent for those with incomes over
$35,000; 40 per cent for those with incomes from $25,000 to $35,000, and
so on, down to those with incomes under $10,000, where the credit might
be set at 100 per cent.”28 To the extent that a donor’s relative sacrifice
depends on wealth as well as income, one might imagine a tax benefit that
decreases as the donor’s wealth and income increase.
Alternatively, the amount of the tax benefit might vary according
to the percentage of the taxpayer’s annual income, or the wealth
contributed by the taxpayer to eligible recipients during the year.29 On this
basis, Paul McDaniel has proposed a matching grant for charitable
donations that would rise from 5 per cent of aggregate donations for donors
contributing less than 2 per cent of their incomes to charities to 50 per cent
of aggregate donations for donors contributing more than 10 per cent of
their incomes.30 For similar reasons, others have advocated a floor on any
tax recognition for charitable contributions, set at a fixed percentage of
each taxpayer’s income for the year.31 In 1969, for example, the U.S.
Treasury Department proposed that the charitable deduction in the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code be available only for contributions exceeding 3 per
cent of the donor’s income.32 Likewise, the Canadian Royal Commission on
Taxation (Carter Commission) considered, but rejected, a floor set at 1 per

cent for donors with taxable incomes exceeding $250,000 (calculated from figures in Revenue Canada,
Taxation Statistics on Individuals: 1990 Tax Year (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1992)).
28

Neil Brooks, Financing the Voluntary Sector: Replacing the Charitable Deduction (Toronto: Law
and Economics Workshop Series, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto) at 24 [Brooks, Financing the
Voluntary Sector].
29

See e.g. McDaniel, supra note 26 (arguing that the reward rationale “appears to call for a system
which increases the reward as the individual sacrifices a greater proportion of his income to charity” at
394).
30

Ibid. at 397.

31

See e.g. Bittker, “Propriety”, supra note 22 (suggesting that the floor should exclude the least
generous 10 or 20 per cent of donors, at 169); Goode, supra note 10 (explaining that such a measure
would “focus the reward or incentive more sharply by withdrawing the deduction from persons whose
contributions are small relative to income while continuing it for heavier contributions” at 165).
32

See the discussion of this proposal in McDaniel, supra note 26 at 387-88.
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cent of the donor’s income.33 Besides targeting the reward at the most
generous contributors, such a floor would also reduce administrative costs
associated with tax assistance for charitable giving.34
Although a reward rationale for the tax recognition of charitable
contributions suggests a number of possible methods for this recognition,
the rationale itself is deeply problematic. While generosity is undoubtedly
worthy of praise, it is not clear that it merits monetary rewards. On the
contrary, as critics from radically different philosophical perspectives have
pointed out, to reward generosity through monetary means contradicts the
spirit underlying the virtue of generosity, “corrupt[ing] the essential dignity
and altruism of a simple gift”35 and “accentuat[ing] the purely selfish goal
of reducing one’s own taxes.”36 Moreover, as John Colombo suggests, “[t]he
work of social scientists may even indicate that providing a material reward
for giving may actually decrease the giving rate where part of what
individuals want from their donation is the ‘warm glow’ and increased selfesteem from behaving altruistically.”37 Therefore, as a rationale for the tax
recognition of charitable contributions, the reward rationale is no more
persuasive than the rationale that a deduction is necessary to ensure an
accurate measure of taxable income.
C.

Subsidizing Charitable Activities

A third rationale for the tax recognition of charitable contributions
is to provide an indirect subsidy to charitable activities by encouraging
charitable gifts. To the extent that charitable giving is what economists
describe as a “normal good,” the demand for which increases as the price
decreases, tax incentives will increase the quantity of charitable gifts by
33

Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, vol. 3 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966) at

224.
34

See e.g. Rendall, supra note 23 at 159; Goode, supra note 10 at 165. See also the discussion in
Aprill, supra note 23 (proposing the idea of an income-related floor on deductible charitable
contributions as a solution to administrative concerns with the extension of the deduction to nonitemizers in the United States, at 859-62).
35

E. Blake Bromley, “Charity, Philanthropy and Stewardship: A Philosophical Perspective on Tax
Reform” (1988) 7:2 Philanthrop. 4 at 12.
36

Neil Brooks, “The Tax Credit and Charitable Contributions: Giving Credit where None is Due”
in Phillips, Chapman & Stevens, supra note 5, 457 at 464 [Brooks, “The Tax Credit and Charitable
Contributions”]. See also Gergen, supra note 22 (asking why, if a society values altruism, it would want
to “sully” this virtue with “a pecuniary reward” at 1395).
37

John D. Colombo, “The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions
Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption” (2001) Wake Forest L. Rev.
657 at 677.
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decreasing their after-tax cost to the donor.38 By increasing aggregate
contributions to charitable organizations, therefore, these incentives
provide an indirect subsidy to the charitable sector.
In order to evaluate the merits of this argument, it is necessary to
examine both the initial justification for subsidizing the charitable sector
and the reasons why indirect subsidies delivered in the form of tax
incentives might be preferred to direct subsidies in the form of sustaining
or matching grants. Finally, on this basis it is useful to consider the
implications of this rationale for the manner in which a tax incentive for
charitable contributions might reasonably be designed.
1.

Public Benefits and the Charitable Sector

Among economists, the charitable sector is generally regarded as
a provider of quasi-public goods and services, the essential characteristics
of which are relative non-rivalness, meaning that enjoyment by one person
does not preclude enjoyment by another, and relative non-excludability,
meaning that it is difficult or impossible to exclude individuals from
enjoying the benefit even if they refuse to pay for it.39 Economic theory
suggests that private markets will oversupply non-rival but excludable goods
and services and under-supply non-excludable goods or services. In either
case, the resolution of these “market imperfections” is one of the main
economic justifications for the existence of a public sector that provides
these public goods and services directly, distributing their costs among
individual beneficiaries through taxes and other levies.40
In addition to the public sector, the charitable sector represents
another response to the existence of market imperfections, providing
38

As economic analysis suggests, this response is a product of the “income effect,” which increases
the donor’s after-tax income from which gifts may be made and the “substitution effect” which reduces
the after-tax cost of these gifts compared to other expenditure items. See Michael K. Taussig,
“Economic Aspects of the Personal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions” (1967) 20 Nat’l
Tax J. 1 (explaining that “[o]nly the price or substitution effect of deductibility can be properly regarded
as the result of using the deduction as a policy variable, since the income effect of deductibility is
incidental and could be achieved equally well by a cut in tax rates, an increase in personal exemptions,
and by similar alternative devices” at 3).
39

See e.g. Kimberley Scharf, Ben Cherniavsky & Roy Hogg, Tax Incentives for Charities in Canada,
Working Paper No. CPRN 03 (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, 1997) at 4-5.
40

In addition to this economic justification for the existence of a public sector, public finance
scholars typically identify as other “fiscal functions” the “distribution function” to moderate inequalities
in the distribution of market outcomes and the “stabilization function” to moderate macroeconomic
fluctuations associated with the business cycle. See e.g. Richard A. Musgrave, Peggy B. Musgrave &
Richard M. Bird, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 1st Canadian ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1987).
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various goods and services such as education, culture, and religion, the
benefits of which are relatively non-rival and non-excludable. Indeed, since
charitable organizations enable individuals to select a range of public goods
and services corresponding to their own values and preferences, this sector
may in some contexts have distinct advantages over the broader public
sector in providing a mix of such goods and services that are more
compatible with the demands of a diverse society.41 Furthermore, to the
extent that the charitable sector is more innovative and service-oriented
than the traditional public sector, it may provide a more efficient vehicle for
the delivery of certain public goods and services.42 Finally, by relieving the
public sector from the sole responsibility of providing public goods and
services, the charitable sector lessens the fiscal burdens of the public sector,
making it better able to perform the important redistribution, allocation,
and stabilization functions that only it can effectively fulfill.43
While it would be wrong to idealize the role that charities can play
in the delivery of public goods and services,44 these arguments suggest that
41

See e.g. Lester M. Salamon, “Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of GovernmentNonprofit Relations” in Walter Powell, ed., The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987) 99; Krever, supra note 21 at 8-13. The normative value underlying
this argument is that of economic efficiency, according to which scarce resources should be allocated
to the uses where they are valued most, absent other considerations such as those of distributive justice.
As a general rule, this approach does not question the values and preferences that citizens may have
with respect to the type and quantity of public goods and services, but takes them as given and attempts
to maximize their satisfaction. In this respect, the economic approach incorporates an appreciation of
individual sovereignty characteristic of various forms of liberal theory. Respect for diversity and social
pluralism are manifestations of this underlying attitude toward individual sovereignty. See e.g. John
Stuart Mill, “On Liberty (1859)” in H.B. Acton, ed., John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism, Liberty,
Representative Government, (London: Everyman’s Library, 1972).
42

See e.g. Scharf, Cherniavsky & Hogg, supra note 39 (suggesting that “voluntary organizations
foster a do-it-yourself culture, which can improve accountability, encourage technological innovation,
and promote efficiency in the use of resources, which may be more desirable if government provision
is encumbered with a lot of bureaucracy” at 5). See also Richard Domingue, The Charity “Industry” and
its Tax Treatment (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1995) (arguing that “[a]t a time when
attempts are being made to reinvent government, it should perhaps be recognized that social services
could be provided much more efficiently by charitable organizations. It could be that communities and
local agencies are in a better position to assess and meet these needs economically than government
employees working in a capital city far removed from the people they serve” at 3).
43

See e.g. McGregor, supra note 23 (noting that charitable contributions “relieve the government
of some of its responsibilities, and make possible some activities, such as those of a cultural nature,
which the government might not feel impelled, or be able, to afford to carry on” at 442).
44

For a more critical assessment of the appropriate role of the charitable sector, see Neil Brooks,
“The Role of the Voluntary Sector in a Modern Welfare State,” in Phillips, Chapman & Stevens, supra
note 5, 166. Common criticisms are that charities, unlike governments, tend to rely on non-professional
staff and volunteers, have unstable funding sources and service capacities, and are decentralized,
uncoordinated, and largely unaccountable to the public.
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charitable organizations can play a valuable role in this area, in aid of which
they should receive financial support from the broader public sector. Where
charitable organizations provide alternative methods of delivering public
goods and services to those employed by the traditional public sector, they
should be supported by public funds. To the extent that charitable
organizations provide quasi-public goods and services, economic theory
also supports the subsidization of these activities in order to prevent their
undersupply.45
2.

Tax Incentives versus Direct Subsidies

Assuming that public subsidies for the charitable sector are
justified, it does not necessarily follow that these subsidies should be
delivered in the form of tax incentives directed at persons making donations
to charitable organizations rather than direct subsidies to the organizations
themselves. Critics of tax incentives for charitable contributions have raised
two objections to these indirect subsidies as a way of providing financial
support to the charitable sector. First, tax incentives are an inefficient way
to subsidize charitable organizations, costing more in foregone revenues
than they produce in increased contributions. Second, tax expenditures for
charitable contributions lack the rationality, controllability, accountability,
and transparency associated with direct government expenditures.46
Notwithstanding these objections, however, it is my view that the social and
cultural pluralism that sustains the charitable sector favours indirect
subsidies in the form of tax incentives either instead of or in addition to
direct grants.47
a.

Efficiency

The cost-effectiveness of a tax incentive for charitable contributions
as opposed to direct government subsidies depends on the extent to which
45

See Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, “The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable
Contributions” (1977) 30 Nat’l Tax. J. 1 at 2-3. See also Gergen, supra note 22 at 1396-1414.
46

See e.g. Rabin, supra note 23 at 918-25; Brooks, “The Tax Credit for Charitable Contributions”,
supra note 36 at 467-72.
47

Indeed, studies indicate that direct government funding constitutes a much larger (and
increasing) share of the revenues of charitable organizations in Canada than donations. See e.g.
Kathleen M. Day & Rose Ann Devlin, Canadian Nonprofit Sector, Working Paper No. CPRN-2
(Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, 1997) (reporting that the percentage of charitable
organization revenues derived from government funding increased from 42.8 per cent in 1989 to 60.2
per cent in 1994, while the percentage of revenues from donations decreased from 21.8 per cent in 1989
to 11.3 per cent in 1994, at 15-16).
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the aggregate amount of charitable gifts increases in response to a decrease
in their after-tax cost as a result of the incentive—a relationship that
economists describe as the “price elasticity of giving.”48 Since reductions in
the after-tax cost of gifts are financed by foregone tax revenues, the price
elasticity of charitable giving reflects the cost-effectiveness of the tax
incentive as a means of funding the charitable sector. While a high price
elasticity indicates that an increase in the aggregate amount of charitable
donations attributable to the tax incentive exceeds the cost of the tax in
terms of foregone revenues, a low price elasticity indicates that the
foregone tax revenues attributable to the tax incentive exceed the resulting
increase in the amount of charitable donations.
A voluminous literature has developed over the past thirty years as
economists have attempted to obtain reliable estimates of the price
elasticity of charitable giving.49 Although the earliest studies reported
relatively low price elasticities of charitable giving,50 suggesting that tax
incentives are an inefficient means of funding charitable organizations,51
subsequent studies reported large negative price elasticities,52 suggesting
that tax incentives may be a cost-effective method of funding charitable

48

For a useful introduction to this concept, see Scharf, Cherniavsky & Hogg, supra note 39 at 8-9.
Briefly, a low price elasticity of charitable giving indicates a slight increase in the aggregate giving in
response to a decrease in the after-tax cost of these gifts, while a high price elasticity of charitable giving
implies that the quantity of charitable donations is highly responsive to changes in the after-tax cost of
these gifts.
49

For summaries of this literature, see J.A. Johnson, “The Determinants of Charitable Giving
with Special Emphasis on the Income Deduction under the Income Tax – A Survey of the Empirical
Literature” (1981) 3 Can. Tax’n: J. Tax Pol’y 258; Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and
Charitable Giving (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) at 16-99; Scharf, Cherniavsky & Hogg,
supra note 39 at 11-17; and Eleanor Brown, “Taxes and Charitable Giving: Is There a New
Conventional Wisdom?” (Paper presented to the National Tax Association, Eighty-Ninth Annual
Conference) (Chicago: National Tax Association, 1996) 153.
50

See e.g. Taussig, supra note 38; Robert A. Schwartz, “Personal Philanthropic Contributions”
(1970) 78 J. Pol’l Econ. 1264; and R.D. Hood, S.A. Martin & L.S. Osberg, “Economic Determinants
of Individual Charitable Donations in Canada” (1977) 10 Can. J. Econ. 653.
51

See e.g. Rendall, supra note 23 at 158-59; Dennis B. Wolkoff, “Proposal for a Radical
Alternative to the Charitable Deduction” [1973] U. Ill. L. F. 279 at 291-93; and Brooks, Financing the
Voluntary Sector, supra note 28 at 18-21.
52

See e.g. Martin Feldstein, “The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part I - Aggregate
and Distributional Effects” (1975) 28 Nat’l Tax J. 81; Charles T. Clotfelter & C. Eugene Steuerle,
“Charitable Contributions” in Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman, eds., How Taxes Affect Economic
Behavior (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980) 403; Harry Kitchen & Richard Dalton,
“Determinants of Charitable Donations by Families in Canada: A Regional Analysis” (1990) 22 Applied
Economics 285; and Harry Kitchen, “Determinants of Charitable Donations in Canada: A Comparison
Over Time” (1992) 24 Applied Econ. 709.
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organizations.53 More recent studies using different methodologies,
however, have reported much lower estimates of price elasticities,54 again
calling into question the efficiency of tax incentives as a method of funding
the charitable sector.55 On this basis, it has been argued that if governments
were to repeal their tax incentives for charitable giving and distribute the
revenue savings in the form of direct grants to charitable organizations
“much of the charitable sector would have considerable additional
revenue.”56
b.

Rationality, controllability, accountability, and transparency

A second objection to tax incentives as a way of subsidizing
charitable organizations is that these tax expenditures are not subject to the
usual criteria applied to government spending, including the rational
allocation of resources among competing priorities, control over the total
amount expended, accountability for these expenditures to Parliament and
the electorate, and transparency in the goals, costs, and beneficiaries of the
expenditures.57 For example, with respect to the allocation of charitable
gifts, Neil Brooks concludes that:
Under the present tax credit for charitable contributions, the total level of expenditures
to various medical research projects depend largely on competing public fund-raising drives.
One could hardly imagine a less appropriate way to decide between—for example, muscular
dystrophy, cancer, heart and stroke, trauma, and mental disability, say, than to base the
decision on the “pay-off” from competing publicity campaigns.58

53

See e.g. Scharf, Cherniavsky & Hogg, supra note 39 at 9 and 14.

54

See e.g. Richard Steinberg, “Taxes and Giving: New Findings” (1990) 1:2 Voluntas 76; Leonard
E. Burman & William C. Randolph, “Measuring Permanent Responses to Capital-Gains Tax Changes
in Panel Data” (1994) 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 794; William C. Randolph, “Dynamic Income, Progressive
Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions” (1995) 103 J. Pol’l Econ. 709; Kevin Stanton
Barrett, Anya M. McGuirk & Richard Steinberg, “Further Evidence on the Dynamic Impact of Taxes
on Charitable Giving” (1997) 50 Nat’l Tax J. 321; and Pamela Greene & Robert McClelland, “Taxes
and Charitable Giving” (2001) 54 Nat’l Tax. J. 443.
55

See e.g. Brooks, “The Tax Credit and Charitable Contributions”, supra note 36 (concluding that
“the best evidence tells us that the amount [of charitable giving stimulated by the Canadian tax credit]
is considerably less than the government loses in revenue ... If the government were to repeal the tax
credit and allocate the saved revenue through semi-autonomous government agencies to the voluntary
sector, much of the charitable sector would have considerable additional revenue” at 471-72).
56

Ibid. at 472.

57

See e.g. ibid. at 467-71. For leading criticisms of tax expenditures, see Surrey, supra note 21; and
Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1985).
58

Brooks, “The Tax Credit and Charitable Contributions”, supra note 36 at 467-68.
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In addition, he suggests that unlike government spending, few
people plan their charitable contributions:
Instead they respond to family or friends’ medical histories, door-to-door collections, the
availability of raffle tickets, or the sponsoring of someone in an event without seriously
weighing the relative seriousness of the cause or the effectiveness of the particular charitable
organization.59

With respect to the control of costs, Brooks continues, tax
incentives make it extremely difficult for the government to determine the
total amount it will have to spend, which will “depend on, among other
things, any changes in the marginal tax rates, the enactment of other tax
incentives, and the success of charities’ appeals.”60 Finally, on the questions
of accountability and transparency, he notes that charities’ activities are
“seldom subject to public scrutiny,” making it possible, according to the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), for “about two dozen
charitable groups in Canada” to fund “world-wide terrorism and ethnic
conflict” without public knowledge.61
c.

Pluralism

These objections pose serious challenges to an argument favouring
tax incentives for charitable contributions as indirect subsidies to charitable
organizations. Nonetheless, it is my view that they do not undermine the
most basic rationale for such an incentive: to enable individuals to choose
through their donations the charitable activities to which they wish to direct
a public subsidy.62 To the extent that these indirect subsidies allow
individuals to select the charitable activities they feel should receive public
support without having to obtain the agreement of a political majority, they
are generally preferable to direct sustaining grants in promoting the very
diversity and innovation that accounts for the charitable sector’s unique
advantages over the traditional public sector. Indeed, in the absence of an
all-knowing legislator who can allocate all public revenues in the most
rational and efficient way, there is often no better basis on which to
subsidize charitable organizations than by the “votes” of charitable donors,
59
60
61
62

Ibid. at 469.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 470.

For a similar conclusion see Krever, supra note 21 at 11-13. For a more general discussion of
the use of the tax system to vote on public spending decisions, see Saul Levmore, “Taxes as Ballots”
(1998) 65 U. Chicago L. Rev. 387.
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however rational or irrational these votes may be.
As a result, even if tax incentives for charitable contributions are a
less cost-effective method of subsidizing charitable organizations than
direct government grants, there are good reasons to favour tax incentives
on broader policy grounds.63 Although it might be argued that direct
matching grants are as consistent with pluralistic objectives as indirect tax
expenditures, the latter are more likely than the former to withstand the
kinds of political controls that would undermine their effectiveness in
promoting pluralism.64 For all these reasons, it is possible to justify the use
of tax incentives as indirect subsidies for charitable organizations.
Pluralism, of course, has its limits, and the funding of terrorist
organizations is clearly outside the scope of this rationale for an indirect
subsidy in the form of a tax incentive. Nonetheless, the funding of terrorist
organizations is neither inconceivable where charitable organizations
receive public funds through direct grants, nor inevitable where subsidies
are delivered indirectly in the form of tax incentives. On the contrary, in
either case, the key to ensuring that public funds are used for the public
benefit lies in the regulation of the charitable sector through disclosure and

63

See e.g. Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 45 (“[p]ublic policy involves much more than whether
an additional dollar of subsidies can generate more than a dollar of charity” at 11). See also Colombo,
supra note 37 (adding that estimates of the price elasticity of charitable giving may not provide an
accurate measure of the relative cost-effectiveness of tax incentives and direct grants. It is not obvious
that governments would collect the taxes that are foregone by tax incentives, and indisputable that the
collection and distribution of these revenues to charitable organizations would involve additional
administrative and compliance costs that should also be taken into account in any efficiency analysis at
684, n. 128). On the other hand, any measure of the cost-effectiveness of indirect subsidies in the form
of tax incentives should also account for administrative costs incurred by charitable organizations to
obtain private donations and administrative and compliance costs associated with the incentives
themselves.
64

See e.g. Bittker, “Propriety”, supra note 22 (concluding that “I have very little confidence that
a system of matching grants could be administered without administrative and congressional
investigations, loyalty oaths, informal or implicit warnings against heterodoxy, and the other trappings
of governmental support than the tax deduction has, so far, been able to escape” at 147-52); Goode,
supra note 10 (considering it “unlikely” that a system of direct matching grants “would be as free of
undesirable controls or would serve the values of pluralism as well” at 163); John G. Simon, “Charity
and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System” (1978) 5 Prob. Law. 1 (observing that “[t]he tax allowance
method has at least the virtue that it does not call upon the government to play an active role in singling
out the chosen few” at 82); Krever, supra note 21 (concluding that “a matching grant system cannot
effectively promote the values of pluralism. If pluralist decision making in the allocation of the
government funds for charitable purposes is to be preserved, proposals to replace the current tax
expenditure with a matching grant system must be viewed with suspicion” at 21-25); and Evelyn Brody,
“Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert” (1999) 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 687
(suggesting that “one of the reasons why we use the indirect tax subsidy approach is that we are a very
heterogeneous society. As such, we find it difficult to agree on which functions to subsidize” at 757).
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reporting requirements, and periodic audits.65 As with governments, public
accountability does not necessarily turn on whether funds are spent directly
or indirectly. Indeed, the practice of publishing regular tax expenditure
budgets makes the annual cost of tax incentives as much a matter of public
record and debate as the annual cost of direct spending programs.66
3.

Designing a Tax Incentive for Charitable Contributions

If the purpose of a tax incentive for charitable contributions is to
provide an indirect subsidy to charitable organizations that produce quasipublic goods and services, the design of the incentive should presumably
advance this purpose. The elements of a tax incentive for charitable
contributions include: the kinds of recipients donations to which should be
eligible for the tax incentive, the types of contributions for which the
incentive is available, and the structure of the tax benefit available to those
making qualifying contributions to eligible recipients. A further issue
concerns the existence of any limit on the extent to which donors may claim
the tax benefit.
a.

Eligible recipients

Beginning with the kinds of recipients that should be eligible for
tax-preferred donations, the rationale for the incentive should presumably
define the scope of its application. To the extent that the incentive is
intended to subsidize the production of quasi-public goods and services by
charitable organizations, therefore, it should be available for any
contribution to a charitable organization involved in activities that provide
quasi-public goods or services. Since the subsidy is designed to support only
activities having a public benefit, however, it is reasonable to require
eligible recipients to devote all of their resources to these activities, or
related activities having a public benefit, and to deny or revoke eligibility
to organizations engaging in other activities that are either detrimental to
the public good or carried on primarily for private advantage. In order to
65

See e.g. Lorne Sossin, “Regulating Virtue: A Purposive Approach to the Administration of
Charities” in Phillips, Chapman & Stevens, supra note 5, 373 (indicating among other things that only
0.75 per cent of Canadian charities are audited on a regular basis, at 388-89). For a recent discussion
of these issues, see Voluntary Sector Initiative, Interim Report of the Joint Regulatory Table: Improving
the Regulatory Environment for the Charitable Sector (August, 2002), online:
<http://www.vsi-isbc.ca/eng/regulations/pdf/interim_report_full.pdf> [Voluntary Sector].
66

For the most recent tax expenditure budget in Canada, see Department of Finance, Tax
Expenditures and Evaluations 2002 (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2002) [Department of
Finance, Tax Expenditures].
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ensure public accountability for these tax expenditures, it seems reasonable
to enforce these requirements by regular audits and to require public
reporting of revenues and disbursements by eligible recipients.67
Although arguably clear in the abstract, the application of these
principles to actual organizations involves often subtle distinctions between
the concepts of public benefit, public detriment, and private advantage.
While these distinctions are often easier to draw in the context of concrete
cases, the pluralistic rationale for indirectly subsidizing charitable
organizations through tax incentives suggests at least some guidelines for
the interpretation of each of these concepts.
The pluralistic goals of the incentive suggest that public benefits
should be broadly defined to include economic and non-economic goods as
well as the promotion of non-majoritarian values. To the extent that
pluralism itself is conceived as a public good, it seems reasonable to extend
the concept of a public benefit to include the advancement of alternative
belief systems, both spiritual and ideological. On this basis, one might also
favour the inclusion of the “advancement of religion” as a charitable
purpose68 and question the so-called “doctrine of political purposes,” which
denies charitable status to organizations aimed at promoting social change
or a particular point of view.69 Where the means or ends of this social
change contradict the values of a free and democratic society, however,
eligibility should be denied on the basis that the organization’s purposes or
activities are detrimental to the public good. Obvious examples include the

67

For a balanced discussion of reporting requirements for the charitable sector, see Voluntary
Sector, supra note 65 at 7-17.
68

Jim Phillips, “Religion, Charity, and the Charter” in Phillips, Chapman & Stevens, supra note
5, 316 at 317 [Phillips, “Religion, Charity, and the Charter”]. Phillips discusses limitations in the AngloCanadian definition of “religion,” but concludes that any benefits from the pursuit of religious activities
should be regarded as private and that “[i]n a secular age, there seems little justification for the state
to assist the expression of that preference” at 335. Phillips also provides a thorough examination of this
issue in Canadian law.
69

For a discussion of this doctrine in the Canadian context, see Abraham Drassinower, “The
Doctrine of Political Purposes in the Law of Charities: A Conceptual Analysis” in Phillips, Chapman
& Stevens, supra note 5, 288 (accepting for the purposes of his analysis the distinction between
charitable and political purposes, but regarding advocacy for social change to advance minimal
conditions of human dignity as charitable and not political). For a recent effort by the Canadian revenue
authorities to articulate the scope of the political purposes doctrine, see CCRA, Policy Statement CPS022, “Political Activities” (2 September 2003), online: <http://www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/
tax/charities/policy/cps/cps-022-e.html> [CCRA, “Political Activities”]. For a recent critique of the
political purposes doctrine in the Canadian context see Richard Bridge, “The Law of Advocacy by
Charitable Organizations: The Case for Change” (2002) 21 E.T.P.J. 92.
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practice or promotion of discrimination70 or terrorism.71
As for the concept of private advantage, the provision of quasipublic goods and services rationale suggests that recipient organizations
should not be eligible where their aims and activities do not extend to a
sufficiently large segment of the community to constitute a public benefit.72
Nor should an organization qualify as an eligible recipient where it diverts
any of its resources to the personal benefit of its officers or members, since
this result would contradict the purpose of the subsidy to provide public
resources for public benefits. Although an organization’s activities may be
such that the immediate beneficiaries are small in number, its aims and
activities should qualify for recognition where this targeted assistance
furthers a broader public good. Such is the case, for example, with the
traditional charitable purpose of the relief of poverty.73
b.

Qualifying contributions

The second issue in designing a tax incentive for charitable
donations concerns the kinds of contributions that should qualify for
support. In this respect, at least two decisions must be made. The first
decision concerns the kinds of contributions for which the incentive is
70

See e.g. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (in which the U.S. Supreme
Court denied charitable status to a non-profit private school with a racially discriminatory admissions
policy). For a similar issue in the Canadian context see Canada Trust Co. v. Ontario Human Rights
Commission (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 481 (C.A.) (in which the court struck down discriminatory provisions
in a charitable trust as offensive to public policy). For a useful discussion of this decision and the
manner in which values reflected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be used to
disqualify organizations from charitable status see Mayo Moran, “Rethinking Public Benefit: The
Definition of Charity in the Era of the Charter” in Phillips, Chapman & Stevens, supra note 5, 251. For
a critical evaluation of the U.S. Treasury Department’s power to deny or revoke charitable status on
public policy grounds, see David A. Brennan, “The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public
Policy, and ‘Charity’ in Contemporary Society” (2000) 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 389.
71

See Act, supra note 2, s. 168(3) and the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act, S.C.
2001, c. 41, s. 4(1)(a), which provides for the denial or revocation of charitable status where the Federal
Court concludes on the basis of information presented to it—including intelligence information that
need not be disclosed to the applicant or registered charity—that there are reasonable grounds to
conclude that the applicant or registered charity “made, makes or will make available any resources,
directly or indirectly” to an organization or person that “engages or will engage in terrorist activities.”
72

See e.g. Verge v. Somerville, [1924] A.C. 496 (P.C.) [Verge] (concluding that in order to be
charitable, an organization’s purposes must be for “the benefit of the community or of an appreciably
important class of the community” at 499). This requirement was adopted by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada v. M.N.R., [1967] S.C.R. 133 [Guaranty Trust]; and Vancouver
Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 10 [Vancouver Society].
73

Commissioners for the Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531 at 583
(H.L.) [Pemsel]. The Pemsel classification of charitable purposes was approved by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Guaranty Trust, supra note 72 at 141, and Vancouver Society, supra note 72 at 102-03.
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available, while the second concerns the character of a charitable
contribution as distinct from other non-qualifying transactions with
charitable organizations.
With respect to the first question, possible alternatives include the
following: cash, property in kind, and services. While ease of administration
might suggest that qualifying gifts should be limited to cash donations,
which provide the greatest flexibility to the eligible recipient and need not
be valued in order to determine the amount of the tax benefit, the purpose
of indirectly subsidizing eligible recipients seems to oppose any such
distinction. On the contrary, to the extent that the incentive is intended to
subsidize charitable organizations, encouraging gifts of property in kind
and services is also desirable.74
The second question is logically addressed by examining the
consideration, if any, moving from the recipient to the donor. Since the
purpose of the tax incentive is to subsidize eligible recipients, albeit
indirectly, the incentive should apply only to the extent that the value of the
donor’s gift exceeds the value of any consideration in return. Otherwise, the
tax expenditure merely subsidizes the donor’s personal consumption
without providing any economic benefit to the recipient organization.
Where the consideration moving from the recipient to the donor is nominal
or intangible, as with public acknowledgement of a donor’s gift, the indirect
subsidy rationale still applies, since the minimal cost of this consideration
leaves the recipient organization with the economic benefit that the tax
incentive is designed to provide.75 Nor should the donor’s purpose in
making the gift matter, so long as it confers an economic benefit on the
recipient organization. Nonetheless, where the donor makes the gift for the
purpose of producing income, it should not be possible to deduct the same
amount as was claimed for the purpose of the tax incentive. Instead, the
most logical approach would be to permit a deduction only for the net cost
of the gift after deducting the amount of the tax benefit received on account

74

While some tax theorists object to any tax recognition for gifts of service on the basis that the
donor obtains an implicit deduction through the non-taxation of the “imputed income” represented by
the performance of services, this result is best explained in terms of a more basic principle against the
taxation of imputed income from self-performed services. See the discussion in Duff, “Charitable
Contributions”, supra note 5 at 410. See also McDaniel, supra note 26 (suggesting that “federal
assistance could match contributions in services just as it could contributions in cash” if it is desired “to
encourage volunteer work” at 396).
75

For a contrary view, see Colombo, supra note 37 (arguing that the rationale for subsidization
does not exist where the availability of this quid pro quo overcomes a “free-riding tendency” on the part
of potential contributors, at 697-701).
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of the incentive.76
c.

Tax benefit

The third element in the design of a tax incentive for charitable
contributions is the specific form that the incentive should take. Here too,
the design of the incentive should advance its underlying purpose of
providing an indirect subsidy to charitable organizations producing quasipublic goods and services. More generally, to the extent that pluralism itself
is regarded as a public good, the incentive should be designed to promote
a diversity of organizations and perspectives by placing greater emphasis on
the number of donors than the size of their donations.
Emphasizing the first of these objectives, some commentators have
suggested that the amount of the tax benefit should vary according to the
extent of the public benefit derived from the gift. According to Wayne
Thirsk, for example:
it would be desirable to disaggregate within an expenditure category and confer different
rates of credit on items that contribute different amounts of social benefit. Not all charitable
activities, for example, may yield the same degree of social value, in which case a policy of
differentiated tax credits is called for.77

On this basis, it follows that a tax incentive for charitable
contributions should provide larger tax benefits for gifts to organizations
providing broader public benefits, and smaller tax benefits for gifts to
organizations providing more localized benefits.
While this approach may be theoretically sound, and feasible in
some contexts, it is likely to founder on the actual measurement of public
benefits, which can depend on value judgments that are often difficult to
reconcile.78 More importantly, since the purpose of an indirect subsidy in
76

If the incentive took the form of a flat-rate credit of 40 per cent, for example, a donor making
a $100 gift would obtain a credit of $40, which would be subtracted from the amount of the gift to leave
a deductible expense of $60.
77

Supra note 10 at 41-42. See also Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 45 (arguing that “[t]he proper
level of the tax credit depends on the ‘external’ content of the benefits that the charity-financed
activities confer; it depends, in other words, on the relationship between the marginal evaluations of the
primary sharing group, namely, voluntary donors, and the community-at-large” at 14); and Scharf,
Cherniavsky and Hogg, supra note 39 (suggesting that “we should try to encourage donations to
charities that provide goods or services to a large number of consumers” at 9).
78

See e.g. Wolkoff, supra note 51 (most religious gifts “help maintain the donors’ congregations”
and are “directed at satisfying the needs of the donor, not at satisfying the needs of society at large” at
288); and Bromley, supra note 35 (“[r]eligious activities are justifiably ‘charitable’ on the basis that they
are beneficial to the community as a whole because they contribute to bettering the conduct and
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the form of a tax incentive is to promote pluralism in the allocation of
public funds, any decision to favour some activities over others is arguably
incompatible with this type of subsidy as opposed to direct government
grants. Indeed, to the extent that pluralism itself is regarded as a public
good, a tax incentive for charitable contributions should not discriminate
among different activities or organizations, except to deny charitable status
to organizations the aims or activities of which contradict the values of a
free and democratic society.
From this perspective, one might also question the structure of a
deduction for charitable contributions, which differentiates among donors
by providing a larger tax subsidy for contributions from high-income donors
than low-income donors and no subsidy for contributions from donors
whose incomes are too low to pay any tax. To the extent that charitable
contributions operate as “votes” to direct public subsidies to the
organizations of the donor’s choosing,79 a deduction weighs the votes of
high-income donors more heavily than those of lower income donors and
completely disenfranchises the lowest income donors who pay no tax.
Rather than promoting genuine pluralism, therefore, a deduction is apt to
foster a kind of “philanthropic paternalism,” where the mix of goods and
services provided by the charitable sector is shaped more by an affluent
minority than by the community as a whole.
For this reason, a tax incentive for charitable contributions should
ideally take the form of a tax credit or rebate, the value of which does not
vary according to the donor’s level of income.80 In addition, the credit
should be fully refundable in order to ensure that the subsidy is available
for donors whose incomes are too low to pay tax.81 The credit might also
include a declining rate structure based on the amount claimed, thereby
promoting a more genuine pluralism by providing a larger subsidy for small
and medium-sized donations and a smaller subsidy for large donations.82 If
character of citizens” at 14).
79

Levmore, supra note 62.

80

For a similar argument to this effect, see Krever, supra note 21 (criticizing the “upside-down”
character of a deduction and recommending a flat-rate “tax rebate” which “could be used to offset part
of the taxpayer’s tax liability” at 20, 25).
81

For similar arguments, see McDaniel, supra note 26 (suggesting that society would be “greatly
enhanced” by extending the pluralism of a tax incentive for charitable contributions to 100 per cent of
contributors, at 391); Brooks, Financing the Voluntary Sector, supra note 28 (favouring a refundable tax
credit at 23-24).
82

A good example might be the political contributions tax credit in Act, supra note 2, s. 127(3),
which, although non-refundable, provides for a credit of 75 per cent of the first $200 contributed to a
registered political party or candidate in a taxation year, 50 per cent of the next $350 contributed in the
year, and 33 1/3 per cent of the next $525, for a maximum credit against tax otherwise payable of $500
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this approach were adopted, however, it might be necessary to prohibit the
deduction of gifts made for the purpose of earning income.
d.

Limit

A final issue in the design of a tax incentive for charitable giving
involves the existence of an overall limit on the amount that donors could
claim every year. Since more affluent donors are able to make larger
contributions to charitable organizations than donors with less income or
wealth, a tax benefit based solely on the amount contributed allows more
affluent donors to direct more public funds to organizations of their
choosing than less affluent donors. In addition to a declining rate structure,
therefore, a tax incentive for charitable contributions might reasonably
impose a limit on the maximum tax benefit that may be claimed.83
One such approach, currently employed in Canada and the United
States, is to limit the total amount of charitable contributions for which a
tax credit could be claimed to a fixed percentage of the donor’s income for
the year.84 In this way, donors would be limited not only in the extent to
which they could direct public funds to their preferred activities, but also
in their ability to avoid all tax liability by making charitable gifts the total
value of which exceeds their annual income. As Peter Wiedenbeck explains,
an income-related ceiling on total gifts that may be claimed “reflects a
judgment ... that although charitable contributions are important and
should be encouraged, every taxpayer should bear part of the burden of
supporting the government.”85 In this respect, he adds, such a limit
functions “as a mechanism to effectuate an appropriately limited consumer
sovereignty over social service expenditures.”86
While this approach might make sense for a tax incentive delivered
in the form of a deduction or non-refundable credit, it seems incompatible
with the main objective of a refundable credit of providing an equal tax
on annual contributions of $1,075.
83

See e.g. Brooks, Financing the Voluntary Sector, supra note 28 (“if the pluralism argument is to
be taken seriously, the maximum tax credit available to each taxpayer could be limited” at 23-24).
84

In Canada, this percentage was originally set at 10 per cent of the donor’s income for the year,
but was increased to 20 per cent in 1972, 50 per cent in 1996, and 75 per cent in 1997. In the United
States, the ceiling was originally 15 per cent of the donor’s income, but was subsequently increased to
50 per cent. See the discussion of these ceilings in Duff, “Charitable Contributions”, supra note 5 at 42023.
85

Peter J. Wiedenbeck, “Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective” (1985) 50 Mo. L. Rev.
85 at 115.
86

Ibid. at 117.
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benefit for charitable contributions made by all donors irrespective of their
incomes. Since an income-related ceiling along these lines could limit the
tax benefit available to donors with little or no taxable incomes, it could
actually undermine the genuine pluralism that a refundable tax credit is
designed to promote. A more appropriate limit on the maximum tax benefit
available might be based on the aggregate amount donated over a specific
period of time (for example, up to $10,000 of tax-assisted donations per
year) or the amount of the benefit itself. In New Zealand, for example, the
introduction of a new income tax in 1976 included a tax incentive for
charitable contributions providing a credit of 50 per cent up to a maximum
tax savings of $175.87 To the extent that this limit prevents a donor’s estate
from claiming credits in the year of the donor’s death, however, the
incentive might reasonably permit a limited carryback for this purpose.
III.

PRACTICE: TAX INCENTIVES FOR CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS IN CANADA

As explained in the introduction, the Canadian income tax
recognizes contributions to charitable organizations by permitting: a
deduction in computing the donor’s net income where these gifts are made
for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business; a
deduction in computing taxable income where the gift is made by a
corporation; a non-refundable tax credit where the gift is made by an
individual; and full or partial exemptions from capital gains tax otherwise
payable where the subject matter of the gift consists of qualifying cultural
property, publicly traded securities, or ecologically sensitive land. While the
first method of tax recognition is consistent with ordinary principles for the
computation of a taxpayer’s income from a business, the others are best
conceived as tax incentives or tax expenditures that provide an indirect
subsidy to eligible recipients by encouraging donors to make qualifying
gifts. The following sections examine the elements of these three tax
incentives, considering the kinds of recipients of donations that are eligible
for tax recognition, the types of gifts that qualify for tax recognition, and
the structure of the tax benefit available under each incentive.88
A.

Eligible Recipients

87
88

Krever, supra note 21 at 27.

For a useful survey of these elements for the tax treatment of charitable contributions in
Canada, see David P. Stevens, “Update on Charity Taxation” (2002) 28 Report of proceedings of the
annual tax conference convened by the Canadian Tax Foundation 1.
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Although different statutory rules govern the deduction for
corporate donations, the credits for individual donations, and the full or
partial capital gains exemptions for gifts of cultural property, publicly
traded securities, and ecologically sensitive land, all share similar
definitions of eligible recipients. According to subsection 110.1(1) of the
Act, for example, corporations may claim a deduction in respect of the
following categories of gifts:
•

gifts of ecologically sensitive land (as certified by the Minister of the
Environment) to “Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or a municipality
in Canada,” or to “a registered charity one of the main purposes of which is ... the
conservation and protection of Canada’s heritage”;

•

gifts of qualifying cultural property (other than ecologically sensitive land), as
determined by the Canadian Cultural Property Export Review Board, to “an
institution or a public authority in Canada that was, at the time the gift was made,
designated” as an eligible recipient under subsection 32(2) of the Cultural Property
Export and Import Act;

•

gifts, other than gifts of ecologically sensitive land or qualifying cultural property,
to “Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province” that were made before
February 19, 1997; and

•

gifts, other than gifts of ecologically sensitive land, qualifying cultural property,
or to the federal government or a province, to:
(i)

“a registered charity,”

(ii)

“a registered Canadian amateur athletic association,”

(iii)

a housing corporation in Canada described in s. 149(1)(i) as being
“constituted exclusively for the purpose of providing low-cost housing
accommodation for the aged, no part of the income of which was
payable to, or was otherwise available for the personal benefit of, any
proprietor, member or shareholder thereof,”

(iv)

“a municipality in Canada,”

(v)

“the United Nations or an agency thereof,”

(vi)

“a university outside Canada that is prescribed to be a university the
student body of which ordinarily includes students from Canada,”

(vii)

“a charitable organization outside Canada to which Her Majesty in
right of Canada has made a gift in the year or in the 12-month period
preceding the year,” or

(viii)

“Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province.”
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An identical list of eligible recipients appears in section 118.1,
which governs the non-refundable credit for individual gifts. Similarly,
subparagraph 39(1)(a)(i.1), which exempts capital gains on gifts of
qualifying cultural property, applies only where the gift is made to an
institution or public authority designated by the Cultural Property Export
and Import Act. Likewise, subparagraphs 38(a.1) and (a.2) of the Act, which
provide a partial exemption from capital gains on gifts of publicly traded
securities and ecologically sensitive land, apply only where the gift is made
to a “qualified donee,” defined in subsection 149.1(1) as all of the
recipients listed above except the designated institution or public authority
applicable for gifts of cultural property.
Of these eligible recipients, the most important category is a
“registered charity,” defined in subsection 248(1) of the Act as:
(a)

a charitable organization, private foundation or public foundation, within the
meanings assigned by subsection 149.1(1), that is resident in Canada and was
either created or established in Canada, or

(b)

a branch, section, parish, congregation or other division of an organization or
foundation described in paragraph ... (a), that is resident in Canada and was
either created or established in Canada and that receives donations on its own
behalf,

that has applied to the Minister in prescribed form for registration, and is at that time
registered as a charitable organization, private foundation or public foundation.

As a registered charity, a charitable organization or foundation is
required to file an annual information return including schedules and
financial statements disclosing the charity’s sources of income and the
nature of its disbursements and expenditures.89 Failure to file this return is
a ground for revoking charitable status.90
Section 149.1 of the Act contains the statutory rules defining
charitable organizations and foundations. According to the definitions in
subsection 149.1(1), a “charitable organization” means “an organization,
whether or not incorporated”:
(a)

all the resources of which are devoted to charitable activities carried on by the
organization itself,

(b)

no part of the income of which is payable to, or is otherwise available for, the
personal benefit of any proprietor, member, shareholder, trustee or settlor

89

Supra note 2, s. 149.1(14). See CCRA, T4033, “Completing the Registered Charity Information
Return” (2001), online: <http://www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/E/pub/tg/t4033/t4033-02e.pdf>.
90

Supra note 2, s. 168(1)(c).
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thereof, [and]
(c)

more than 50 per cent of the directors, trustees, officers or like officials of which
deal with each other and with each of the other directors, trustees, officers or
officials at arm’s length ...

while a “charitable foundation” means
a corporation or trust that is constituted and operated exclusively for charitable purposes,
no part of the income of which is payable to, or otherwise available for, the personal benefit
of any proprietor, member, shareholder, trustee or settlor thereof, and that is not a
charitable organization.

A charitable foundation is classified as a “public foundation” where
a majority of the foundation’s “directors, trustees, officers or like officials
deal with each other and each of the other directors, trustees, officers or
officials at arm’s length,” provided that no more than 50 per cent of the
foundation’s capital was contributed either by a single person or by
members of a group who do not deal with each other at arm’s length.91
Otherwise, the charitable foundation is classified as a “private foundation.”
Because the opportunities for abuse are greater, private foundations are
subject to more stringent regulatory requirements than public
foundations.92
Whereas the distinction between a public and private foundation
turns on the extent to which it is controlled by a single person or related
group, the distinction between a charitable organization and a charitable
foundation generally turns on the manner in which it engages in charitable
pursuits. As a general rule, charitable organizations must devote their
resources to “charitable activities” that they themselves carry on. However,
subsection 149.1(6) relaxes this requirement by considering a charitable
organization to be devoting its resources to charitable activities where it
carries on a related business, disburses not more than 50 per cent of its
income to qualified donees, or disburses income to a registered charity with
which it is “associated.”93 In contrast, charitable foundations are merely
required to operate for “charitable purposes,” a term that subsection
91

Ibid., s. 149.1(1). For foundations registered before February 16, 1984, the limit on contributions
of capital by a single person or group of persons not dealing with each other at arm’s length is 75 per
cent rather than 50 per cent.
92

See ibid., ss. 149.1(3) and (4), which list various circumstances in which the Minister may revoke
the registration of a public foundation or a private foundation.
93

According to the Act, ibid., s. 149.1(7), the Minister may on application designate a registered
charity as a charity associated with one or more registered charities where “the Minister is satisfied that
the charitable aim or activity of each of the registered charities is substantially the same ... .”
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149.1(1) specifically defines to include “the disbursement of funds to
qualified donees.” In general, therefore, charitable organizations engage in
charitable activities themselves, while charitable foundations operate for
charitable purposes by disbursing funds to charitable organizations and
other qualified donees.
Notwithstanding this distinction between charitable organizations
and charitable foundations, the Act requires both types of registered charity
to be exclusively charitable, devoting “all” of their “resources” to charitable
activities in the case of charitable organizations, and operating “exclusively”
for charitable purposes in the case of charitable foundations. Where a
charitable foundation or organization devotes “substantially all of its
resources” to charitable purposes or activities, however, subsections
149.1(6.1) and (6.2) of the Act permit the charity to devote part of its
resources to “political activities,” provided that they are “ancillary and
incidental” to the foundation’s purposes or the organization’s activities and
“do not include the direct or indirect support of, or opposition to, any
political party or candidate for public office.”94 More generally, judicial
decisions have held that the pursuit of purposes that are not themselves
charitable, but “incidental to” or “a means to the fulfilment of” other
charitable purposes will not deprive a foundation or organization of
charitable status.95
Since the Act does not, aside from these provisions, define the terms
“charitable activities” and “charitable purposes,” Canadian courts have
generally sought guidance in the common law of trusts, which admits
charitable purpose trusts as an exception to the general rule that a purpose
trust is invalid. Although the definition of a charitable organization
mentions charitable activities, not purposes, the Supreme Court of Canada
has downplayed the distinction, stating that “it is really the purpose in
furtherance of which an activity is carried out, and not the character of the
activity itself, that determines whether or not it is of a charitable nature.”96
94

The CCRA allows a charity to devote as much as 10 per cent of its resources to political activities
and still satisfy the requirement that “substantially all” of its resources be devoted to purely charitable
activities. Recognizing that this policy “may have a negative impact on smaller charities” whose ability
to conduct ancillary political activities may be thus limited, the CCRA proposes to be more forgiving of
smaller charities by increasing the threshold to 20 per cent for registered charities with annual incomes
of less than $50,000, 15 per cent for those with incomes between $50,000 and $100,000, and 12 per cent
for those with incomes between $100,000 and $200,000. See CCRA, “Political Activities”, supra note 69,
s. 9. The CCRA is also willing to accommodate organizations whose relative political spending may spike
in a particular year if the average over several years would be within the parameters. See ibid., s. 9.1.
95

British Launderers’ Research Association v. Borough of Hendon Rating Authority, [1949] 1 K.B.
462 (C.A.), cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Guaranty Trust, supra note 72 at 143.
96

Vancouver Society, supra note 72 at 108.

2004]

Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions

29

Where an organization is established for a charitable purpose, however, the
Court has also emphasized that it is necessary to consider the activities
carried on by the organization in order to ensure that they are “in
furtherance of” the charitable purpose.97
The traditional starting point for judicial interpretation of
charitable purposes is Lord MacNaghton’s statement in Pemsel:
“Charity” in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty;
trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts
for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding
98
heads.

Superimposed on these categories, however, is a further
requirement that the purpose of the trust must be “for the benefit of the
community or of an appreciably important class of the community.”99
Although applicable to each of the Pemsel categories, this additional
requirement is particularly relevant to the fourth category, “other purposes
beneficial to the community,” since, as Justice Gonthier suggested in
dissent in Vancouver Society, “under the first three heads, public benefit is
essentially a rebuttable presumption, whereas under the fourth head it must
be demonstrated.”100
In determining whether a purpose is charitable under the fourth
head, English and Canadian courts have held that it is necessary to
determine not only whether the purpose is of benefit to the community, but
also whether it is beneficial “in a way that the law regards as charitable.”101
In making this determination, they have generally referred to the preamble
of the Charitable Uses Act, 1601,102 commonly called the Statute of Elizabeth,
97
98
99

Ibid. at 131.
Supra note 73 at 583.
Verge, supra note 72 at 499, cited with approval in Guaranty Trust, supra note 72 at 141.

100

Vancouver Society, supra note 72 at 45.

101

D’Aguiar v. Guyana Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [1970] T.R. 31 (P.C.) [D’Aguiar], cited
with approval in Vancouver Society, supra note 72 at 121. Among the reasons why the Court affirmed
this additional requirement in the Vancouver Society case is the need to distinguish between charitable
organizations donations to which are eligible for a corporate deduction or individual credit, and nonprofit organizations, which are tax-exempt but not eligible recipients for the purpose of the deduction
or credit. Since the Act, supra note 2, s. 149(1)(l) defines a non-profit organization as a non-charitable
“club, society or association” that was “organized and operated exclusively for,” among other things,
“social welfare,” the Court concluded that the statutory distinction between charitable and non-profit
organizations would collapse if “public benefit” alone were to qualify as a charitable purpose under the
fourth Pemsel category, supra note 73.
102

43 Eliz. 1, c. 4.
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which listed a number of activities regarded as charitable at the time.103
Traditionally, courts and commentators often emphasized the “spirit and
intendment” of the preamble,104 and attempted to articulate a common
principle to the preamble’s list of charitable activities.105 In contrast, most
modern judicial decisions proceed on an incremental basis, considering the
trend of judicial decisions regarding objects as charitable under this
category and asking “whether, by reasonable extension or analogy, the
instant case may be considered to be in line with these.”106 This incremental
approach is extremely resistant to evolutionary expansion, as illustrated by
the majority decision in Vancouver Society,107 which denied charitable status
under the fourth head to a society devoted to helping immigrant women
find employment or self-employment,108 notwithstanding earlier cases that
had sanctioned charitable trusts for the purpose of aiding the settlement of

103

A modern rendition of the charitable activities listed in the preamble appears in McGovern v.
A.G., [1982] Ch. 321 at 332: “the relief of aged, impotent, and poor people … the maintenance of sick
and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in universities … the
repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, seabanks, and highways … the education and
preferment of orphans … the relief, stock, or maintenance of houses of correction … marriage of poor
maids … supportation, aid, and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed … the
relief or redemption of prisoners or captives, and the aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning
payment of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes.”
104

See e.g. National Anti-Vivisection Society v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1948] A.C. 31
(H.L.) at 63-64, cited with approval in Native Communications Society of B.C. v. M.N.R. (1986), 86
D.T.C. 6357 (F.C.A.) at 6357.
105

See e.g. Spencer G. Maurice & David B. Parker, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed. (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1984) at 90-91 (concluding that “general public utility, with the strongest possible emphasis
on the adjective “general,” was the charitable characteristic possessed in common by the purposes
recited in the preamble” at 92); E. Blake Bromley, “Contemporary Philanthropy – Is the Legal Concept
of “Charity” Any Longer Adequate?” in Donald W.M. Waters, ed., Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 1993
(Toronto: Carswell, 1993) 59 at 65-66 (suggesting that the preamble is best viewed as an agenda for
social improvement); and Gonthier J.’s dissenting judgment in Vancouver Society, supra note 72
(proposing as common principles of all charities: “(1) voluntariness (or ... altruism, that is, giving to third
parties without receiving anything in return other than the pleasure of giving); and (2) public welfare
or benefit in an objectively measurable sense” at 43).
106

D’Aguiar, supra note 101 at 33, cited with approval by Iacobucci J. in Vancouver Society, supra
note 72 at 121.
107
108

Vancouver Society, ibid..

Although considering the society’s purposes non-charitable under the fourth category, the
majority regarded its purposes as charitable under an expansive view of the second category involving
the “advancement of education.” Notwithstanding this conclusion, it denied the society charitable status
on the basis that it was not clear that “all of its resources” would be devoted to this purpose. See ibid.
at 138.
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poor or persecuted immigrants.109 As Mayo Moran and Jim Phillips have
observed: “If one cannot move from poor or persecuted immigrants to
female visible minority immigrants (let alone immigrants generally) one
cannot get very far through analogy.”110
For the purposes of this article there is no need to examine the
other Pemsel categories in detail, or to review Canadian cases on the legal
definition of a charity.111 In general, recent decisions have adopted
expansive interpretations of the “relief of poverty” and “advancement of
education” categories,112 although the latter does not extend to public
education or advocacy that is designed to promote a particular point of
view.113 With respect to the third category, “advancement of religion,” the
courts adhere to a traditional conception, generally insisting on the
existence of a “deity” and distinguishing between religion proper and

109

See e.g. In Re Wallace, [1908] V.L.R. 636 (S.C.) (trust to pay passage money to immigrants
from an English town to Melbourne); Re Stone (1970), 91 N.S.W.W.N. 704 (trust for the promotion of
Jewish settlement in Israel); and Re Morrison (1967), 111 Solicitor’s L. J. 758 (Ch. D.) (trust for the
assistance of refugees).
110

Mayo Moran & Jim Phillips, “Charity and the Income Tax Act: The Supreme Court Speaks”
in Phillips, Chapman & Stevens, supra note 5, 343 at 364. For other commentaries on the decision, see
Deborah J. Lewis, “A Principled Approach to the Law of Charities in the Face of Analogies, Activities
and the Advancement of Education” (2000) 25 Queen’s L.J. 679; David Stevens, “Vancouver Society of
Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R.” (2000) 15:2 Philanthrop. 4; Arthur B. Drache,
“Vancouver Immigrant Women: The First Judicial Interpretation” (2000) 15:2 Philanthrop. 14; and
Wolfe D. Goodman, “A Personal View of the Vancouver Society Decision” (2000) 15:2 Philanthrop. 20.
111

For a detailed discussion of the Pemsel categories see Ontario Law Reform Commission,
Report on the Law of Charities (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1996) at 159-228. See also
Australia, Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organizations (Canberra:
Commonwealth of Australia, 2001). For a useful survey of Canadian cases on the law of charity see Jim
Phillips, “The Federal Court of Appeal and the Legal Meaning of Charity: Review and Critique” in
Phillips, Chapman & Stevens, supra note 5, 219.
112

See e.g. Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Oldham Training and Enterprise Council (1996), 69
T.C. 231 (Ch. D.) (regarding as charitable under the “relief of poverty” heading an organization the
purpose of which was to provide services to the poor to enable them to become economically
independent); and Vancouver Society, supra note 72 (rejecting earlier Canadian understandings of the
“advancement of education” as “formal training of the mind” or the “improvement of a useful branch
of human knowledge”).
113

See e.g. Positive Action Against Pornography v. M.N.R. (1988), 88 D.T.C. 6186 (F.C.A.); Toronto
Volograd Committee v. M.N.R. (1988), 88 D.T.C. 6192 (F.C.A.); Briarpatch Incorporated v. The Queen
(1996), 96 D.T.C. 6294 (F.C.A.); Interfaith Development Education Association v. M.N.R. (1997), 97
D.T.C. 5424 (F.C.A.); and Alliance for Life v. M.N.R. (1999), 99 D.T.C. 5228 (F.C.A.). The CCRA has
recently indicated that it is willing to expand its view of these categories to include organizations that
might otherwise not qualify on the grounds that they are “political” in nature. See CCRA, Policy
Statement CPS-021, “Registering Charities the Promote Racial Equality” (2 September 2003) online:
<http://www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/tax/charities/policy/cps/cps-021-e.html>.
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“ethical systems of belief.”114 Consistent with subsections 149.1(6.1) and
(6.2) of the Act, which permit “ancillary and incidental” political activities,
Canadian courts distinguish between charitable and political activities or
purposes, denying charitable status where the activities or purposes of the
organization or foundation advocate social change or promote a particular
point of view.115 Finally, new subsection 168(3) of the Act provides for the
revocation of charitable status where a Federal Court confirms the decision
of the Solicitor General and the Minister of National Revenue that the
organization or foundation “has made, makes, or will make available any
resources, directly or indirectly,” to an organization or person that “engages
in, or will engage in terrorist activities.”116
B.

Qualifying Gifts

Also common to each of the tax incentives available for charitable
contributions is the requirement that the donor have made a “gift” to the
eligible recipient. In this circumstance, paragraphs 38(a.1) and (a.2) and
subparagraph 39(1)(a)(i.1) of the Act exempt part or all of any gain on the
disposition of publicly traded securities, ecologically sensitive land, or
cultural property, while sections 110.1 and 118.1 permit the donor to claim
a deduction or credit in respect of the “fair market value” of the gift. As a
general rule, fair market value refers to “the highest price available
estimated in terms of money which a willing seller may obtain for the
property in an open and unrestricted market from a willing, knowledgeable
purchaser acting at arm’s length.”117 Although a number of reported cases
consider the fair market value of particular gifts,118 the key interpretive
114

See e.g. Bowman v. Secular Society, [1917] A.C. 406 (H.L.); R. v. Registrar-General, Ex Parte
Segerdal, [1970] 2 Q.B. 697 (C.A.); and Re South Place Ethical Society, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1565 (Ch.). For
a useful discussion of this category in the Canadian context, see Phillips, “Religion, Charity, and the
Charter”, supra note 68 at 335.
115

See e.g. Challenge Team v. Revenue Canada (2000), 2000 D.T.C. 6242 (F.C.A.).

116

Charities Registration (Security Information) Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, ss. 4(1), 7(1). For a critical
evaluation of this legislation, see David G. Duff, “Charitable Status and Terrorist Financing: Rethinking
the Proposed Charities Registration (Security Information) Act” in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem
& Kent Roach, The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2001) 321.
117

Re Mann Estate, [1972] 5 W.W.R. 23 at 27 (B.C. S.C.), aff'd [1973] 4 W.W.R. 223 (B.C. C.A.),
aff'd [1974] 2 W.W.R. 574 (S.C.C.)
118

Several of these cases involve so-called “art flips” in which taxpayers acquired property at one
price and immediately thereafter donated the property to an eligible recipient at an appraised value
significantly in excess of its purchase price, benefitting from the exemption on gifts of cultural property
under the Act, supra note 2, s. 39(1)(a)(i.1) or the rule in s. 46(1)(a) deeming the adjusted cost base
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issues for the purposes of this article concern the characterization of a gift
for the purpose of a tax incentive for charitable contributions and the kinds
of contributions that can be the subject matter of such a gift.
In the absence of a statutory definition of the word gift, Canadian
courts have looked to private law concepts in order to apply these
provisions of the Act. In common law provinces, courts have defined a gift
as “a voluntary transfer of property from one person to another gratuitously
and not as the result of a contractual obligation without anticipation or
expectation of material benefit.”119 In Quebec, on the other hand, a gift is
defined as “a contract by which a person, the donor, transfers ownership of
property by gratuitous title to another person, the donee.”120 According to
section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act:
Both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and recognized sources of
the law of property and civil rights in Canada and, unless otherwise provided by law, if in
interpreting an enactment it is necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles or concepts
forming part of the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made to the rules,
121
principles and concepts in force in the province at the time the enactment is being applied.

As a result, while the civil law concept of a gift applies in Quebec,

of “personal-use property” to be the greater of $1,000 and the amount otherwise determined. See e.g.
Friedberg v. The Queen (1991), 92 D.T.C. 6031 (F.C.A.) [Friedberg]; Arvisais v. M.N.R. (1992), 93 D.T.C.
506 (T.C.C.); Ball v. The Queen, [1993] 2 C.T.C. 2474 (T.C.C.); Gardner v. The Queen, [1993] 2 C.T.C.
2480 (T.C.C.); Bouchard v. The Queen, [1993] 2 C.T.C. 2778 (T.C.C.); Paradis v. The Queen (1996),
[1997] 2 C.T.C. 2557 (T.C.C.); Marcoux-Côté v. The Queen (2000), 2000 D.T.C. 6615 (F.C.A.); Whent
v. The Queen (1999), 2000 D.T.C. 6001 (F.C.A.); Aikman v. The Queen (2002), 2002 D.T.C. 6874
(F.C.A.); Duguay v. The Queen (2000), 2000 D.T.C. 6620 (F.C.A.); Langlois v. The Queen (2000), 2000
D.T.C. 6612 (F.C.A.); and Berubé v. Canada, [2002] 4 C.T.C. 2147 (T.C.C.). In response to these kinds
of transactions, s.118.1(10) was added to the Act by Income Tax, 1990, S.C. 1990, c. 35, s. 10 to authorize
the Canadian Cultural Property Export Review Board to determine the fair market value of gifts of
cultural property, and s. 46(5) was added by Income Tax, 2000, S.C. 2001, c. 17, s. 31 to exclude from
the deemed adjusted cost base rule in s. 46(1)(a) “property acquired by the taxpayer, or a person with
whom the taxpayer does not deal at arm’s length, in circumstances in which it is reasonable to conclude
that the acquisition of the property relates to an arrangement, plan or scheme that is promoted by
another person or partnership and under which it is reasonable to conclude that the property will be
the subject of a gift to which subsection 110.1(1) or ... subsection 118.1(1) applies.”
119

Woolner v. The Queen (1999), 99 D.T.C. 5722 (F.C.A.) at 5723. For similar definitions see The
Queen v. Zandstra (1974), 74 D.T.C. 6416 (F.C.T.D.) [Zandstra] at 6419; McBurney v. The Queen, [1985]
85 D.T.C. 5433 (F.C.A.) [McBurney] at 5435-36; Burns v. M.N.R. (1988), 88 D.T.C. 6101 (F.C.T.D.)
[Burns] at 6103-04, aff’d (1990), 90 D.T.C. 6335 (F.C.A.); Friedberg, supra note 118 at 6032; and Whent
v. The Queen (1996), 96 D.T.C. 1594 (T.C.C.) at 1791, aff’d (2000), 2000 D.T.C. 6001 (F.C.A.).
120

Art. 1806 C.C.Q. See also Art. 1810: “[a] remunerative gift or a gift with a charge constitutes
a gift only for the value in excess of that of the remuneration or charge.”
121

R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 8.1.
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the common law concept applies in the rest of Canada.122
To the extent that the common law concept requires a “voluntary
transfer” for “no benefit or consideration,” while the civil law concept
requires a “contract” to transfer ownership, the Act appears to mandate
different requirements for qualifying gifts in Quebec than in the rest of the
country. Indeed, while the courts in Quebec have recognized a contract of
donation between a charity and a donor as a valid gift,123 the status of such
donations in common law provinces is uncertain.124 More significantly,
while at least one Quebec decision has affirmed the existence of a gift
where a donor purchased tickets for a benefit concert and reception at a
price substantially in excess of their value,125 other cases have generally
disallowed deductions or credits for charitable contributions where the
donor has received valuable consideration in exchange for the
contribution126—even where the taxpayer has sold property to a charitable
122

For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see David G. Duff, “The Federal Income Tax
Act and Private Law in Canada: Complementarity, Dissociation, and Canadian Bijuralism” (2003) 51
Can. Tax J. 1. See also Blake Bromley, “Flaunting and Flouting the Law of Gift: Canada Customs and
Revenue Agency’s Philanthrophobia” (2002) 21 E.T.P.J. 177.
123

Francoeur v. The Queen, [1993] 2 C.T.C. 2440 (T.C.C.).

124

According to the CCRA: “Generally, any legal obligation on the payor to make a donation
would cause the donation to lose its status as a gift. However, when a taxpayer honours a personal
guarantee concerning a loan made to a charity or honours a pledge, the amount can be considered to
be a gift despite its being paid to honour an obligation, if the obligation was entered into voluntarily and
without consideration.” CCRA, Interpretation Bulletin IT-110R3, “Gifts and Official Donation Receipts”
(20 June 1997) at 3-4 [CCRA, “Gifts and Official Donation Receipts”].
125

Aspinall v. M.N.R. (1970), 70 D.T.C. 1669 (Tax Appeal Board). For a similar result, see Gagnon
Estate v. M.N.R. (1960), 60 D.T.C. 347, in which the difference between the fair market value of a farm
sold by the taxpayer to her sons and the actually proceeds received was characterized as a gift for the
purpose of the gift tax in then s. 111 of the Act at 348. In two other cases, however, Quebec courts have
adopted the common law concept of a gift for the purpose of other provisions in the Act. See The Queen
v. Littler (1978), 78 D.T.C. 6179 (F.C.A.) (refusing to apply gift tax to the sale of shares to the taxpayer’s
son for an amount less than their fair market value on the basis that the civil law concept of a gift
“should not be taken to extend the application of section 111 of the Income Tax Act in the Province of
Quebec beyond what it would be in another province” at 6182); and Gervais v. The Queen(1984), 85
D.T.C. 5004 (F.C.T.D.) (concluding that property acquired by the taxpayer from his father at a cost less
than its fair market value was not acquired by way of a gift).
126

See e.g. Woolner, McBurney, and Zandstra, supra note 119 (each of which involved gifts to
religious schools attended by one or more of the donor’s children); Burns, supra note 119 (gifts to a ski
association which conducted a ski camp attended by the donor’s daughter); Dupriez v. The Queen (1998),
98 D.T.C. 1790 (T.C.C.) (gifts to a charitable organization which assisted donors in adopting children
from Vietnam); and Nadeau v. Canada (2001), 2003 D.T.C. 18 (T.C.C.) (donation to college in
exchange for which taxpayer received a computer). For a contrasting result, see Jubenville v. The Queen,
[2002] 4 C.T.C. 2058 (T.C.C.), in which the court disallowed $3,000 of a $14,000 contribution to a
Russian organization on the basis that it was required to adopt a child, but allowed the taxpayer to claim
a charitable contributions tax credit for the remaining $11,000.
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organization for less than its fair market value127 or purchased property
from a charitable foundation for an amount exceeding its fair market
value.128 Where the donor derives a tax advantage or other monetary
benefit from the contribution, however, courts have generally held that
these benefits do not vitiate the existence of a gift.129 As an administrative
practice, moreover, the CCRA allows donors to claim as a qualifying gift
“the difference between the purchase price of a ticket to attend a ‘dinner,
ball, concert or show’ and the fair market value of the food, entertainment,
etc., available to a ticket purchaser,”130 as well as “a part of a parent’s
payment for instruction at a private elementary or secondary school which
offers both secular (academic) and religious education” equal to the part
“for the religious education only.”131
With respect to the kinds of contributions that can be the subject
matter of a gift, an early case suggested that “gifts made in kind instead of
cash are not deductible in practice on account of the problem of correct
valuation.”132 Notwithstanding this concern, a subsequent decision
confirmed that donors may claim a deduction or credit for gifts of property
in kind.133 As an administrative practice, however, the CCRA does not
recognize gifts-in-kind of nominal value, such as gifts of used clothing with
little commercial value.134 In addition, where an individual donates time and
labour to a charitable organization or foundation it has been held that the
value of the donation is not a qualifying gift for the purposes of the
deduction or credit on the basis that the legal meaning of a gift requires the
127
128

Gaudin v. M.N.R. (1955), 55 D.T.C. 385 (Tax Appeal Board) [Gaudin].
Tite v. M.N.R. (1986), 86 D.T.C. 1788 (T.C.C.) [Tite].

129

See e.g. Friedberg, supra note 118 (“The tax advantage which is received from gifts is not
normally considered a ‘benefit’ within [the legal definition of a gift], for to do so would render the
charitable donations deductions unavailable to many donors” at 6032); and Langlois v. The Queen,
[1999] 3 C.T.C. 2589 (T.C.C.) (“The fact that the donor was able to incidentally derive a monetary
benefit from the transactions is of no consequence, since the donee paid no consideration” at 2615),
aff’d 2000 D.T.C. 6612 (F.C.A.). As a result, although some cases have suggested that a gift requires a
“liberal intent” or a “detached and disinterested generosity,” the prevailing view ignores these subjective
factors. See Burns, supra note 119 at 6105; and Tite, ibid. at 1791.
130

CCRA,

“Gifts and Official Donation Receipts”, supra note 124 at 3.

131

Registered Charities Newsletter No. 6 (1996), online:
adrc.gc.ca/E/pub/tg/charitiesnews-06/news6-e.html>.
132

CCRA

<http://www.ccra-

Gaudin, supra note 127 at 386.

133

Consolidated Truck Lines v. MNR (1968), 68 D.T.C. 399 (Tax Appeal Board) (donation of a
yacht to the University of Toronto).
134

CCRA, Interpretation Bulletin IT-297R2, “Gifts in Kind to Charity and Others” (21 March
1990) at para. 6.
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transfer of property and services are not property.135
C.

Tax Benefit

Where a taxpayer makes a qualifying gift to an eligible recipient, the
Act provides three different kinds of tax benefits: a deduction for
corporations, a credit for individuals, and full or partial exemption from
capital gains tax on gifts of cultural property, publicly traded securities, and
ecologically sensitive land. This section examines each of these incentives.
1.

Deduction for Corporations

Where a corporation makes a qualifying gift to an eligible recipient,
the fair market value of the gift is deductible in computing the
corporation’s taxable income for the year or for any of the five subsequent
taxation years.136 While there is no limit on the deductions for gifts of
cultural property and ecologically sensitive land,137 the deduction for other
gifts is generally subject to a ceiling of 75 per cent of the donor’s income for
the year.138 Where the corporation makes a gift of property resulting in a
taxable capital gain or recaptured depreciation, a quarter of this inclusion
may be added to the annual ceiling, effectively increasing the ceiling on
these charitable gifts to the amount of the donor’s income for the year.139
While the current provision was enacted only in 1988,140 a deduction
for corporate charitable contributions dates back to 1930 when the federal
government introduced a deduction available to all taxpayers of up to 10
per cent of their incomes for the year.141 Although there does not appear
to have been any justification for a corporate deduction at the time,142 the
135

Slobodrian v. The Queen, [1998] 3 C.T.C. 2654 (T.C.C.); Slobodrian v. Canada, [2002] 1 C.T.C.
2089 (T.C.C.); and Nasrallah c. Canada (2002), 2003 D.T.C. 1283 (T.C.C.). See also CCRA, “Gifts and
Official Donation Receipts”, supra note 124 (“[a] gift must involve property. Contributions of services
(that is, time, skills, effort) are not property and do not qualify” at 5).
136
137
138
139
140

Act, supra note 2, s. 110.1(1).
Ibid., ss. 110.1(1)(c) and (d).
Ibid., s. 110.1(1)(a).
Ibid.
Income Tax, S.C. 1988, c. 55, s. 78.

141

For a brief history of the introduction of this deduction, see Duff, “Charitable Contributions”,
supra note 5 at 408-09. The 10 per cent ceiling on allowable deductions was reduced to 5 per cent in
1940 and increased to 10 per cent in 1957, 20 per cent in 1972, 50 per cent in 1996, and 75 per cent for
1997 and subsequent taxation years (ibid. at 421).
142

See ibid.
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Exchequer Court speculated on the deduction’s purpose in Olympia Floor
& Wall Tile (Que.) Ltd. v. MNR:
Presumably, a time came in the evolution of income tax law when, the more sophisticated
campaigns of charitable organizations having resulted in corporations being forced to make
charitable contributions (not because they were as corporations capable of charitable
motivation but because an atmosphere was created in which a failure to contribute would
damage the corporate “image” so as to affect adversely the corporation's business
operations), Parliament, for that reason, decided that corporations should have some sort
143
of tax treatment for such contributions as individuals.

While this account seems to suggest that corporate charitable
contributions would be ordinarily deductible in computing the donor’s net
income from its business operations, the court distinguished the deduction
for charitable contributions from the deduction for business expenses on
the basis that the former permits “a deduction of an amount that has been
given out of the corporation’s income after it has been earned and not a
deduction of an amount that has been laid out as part of the income
earning process.”144 Since the court allowed the taxpayer to deduct gifts to
charitable organizations as ordinary business expenses on the basis that
they were incurred for the purpose of gaining or producing income, it
follows that the separate deduction for corporate charitable contributions
should be understood not as a necessary adjustment to accurately measure
income for the year, but as a tax incentive or tax expenditure designed to
provide further encouragement to corporate charitable giving irrespective
of business considerations.145
As a tax expenditure, the deduction for corporate charitable
contributions is estimated to have cost the federal government $180 million
in 1998.146 As a general rule, the additional cost to provincial treasuries,
which levy identical or similar corporate income taxes at approximately half
143
144

Supra note 1 at 283.
Ibid.

145

In this respect, the scheme of the Act assumes a “social responsibility” view of the corporation,
rather than a “profit maximizing” approach. For an illuminating discussion of these issues in the U.S.
context, see Nancy J. Knauer, “The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, The Nature of the
Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity” (1994) 44 DePaul L. Rev. 1 (advocating repeal
of a separate deduction for corporate charitable contributions and the deduction of these gifts as
ordinary business expenses at 41-43).
146

Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures, supra note 66 at Table 2. This amount includes
deductions for “charitable gifts” proper, as well as gifts to the federal government or a province.
According to the Department of Finance, the cost of this tax expenditure is projected to increase to
$200 million in 1999 and $250 million in 2000, after which it is expected to fall to $215 million in 2001
and $165 million in 2002, due to decreases in the general corporate tax rate and reductions in projected
taxable income.
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the federal rates, is roughly half the amount of the federal expenditure.
Statistics on the distribution of corporate donations among different kinds
of registered charities or the distribution of this expenditure among
different corporations are unavailable. Since corporations are generally
taxed at a flat rate, one might conclude that the distribution of the tax
expenditure among different corporations does not raise any concerns
about tax equity. However, since federal and provincial corporate income
tax rates vary according to the kind of income earned, with lower rates for
“manufacturing and processing” income, and for the first $300,000 of
“active business income” earned by a “Canadian-controlled private
corporation,” the corporate deduction provides a different level of tax
assistance for donations from different corporate entities. More
significantly, where the donor corporation incurs a loss, the value of the
deduction is nil, since there is no income against which the fair market
value of a gift may be deducted.
2.

Individual Credit

Unlike charitable contributions by corporations, charitable
contributions by individuals are recognized in the form of a tax credit rather
than a deduction. At the federal level, this credit is computed at the lowest
marginal rate of tax for the first $200 of total gifts claimed in the taxation
year and the highest marginal rate for amounts exceeding $200.147 For the
year 2002, the federal rate structure implied a credit of 16 per cent on the
first $200 claimed each year and 29 per cent on amounts over $200.148 Most
provinces adopt a similar two-tiered rate structure for their credits, which
generally range from 6.05 to 11.25 per cent on the first $200 and 14.07 to
18.02 per cent on amounts above this threshold.149 As a general rule,
therefore, the combined federal and provincial rates for this credit are

147

Act, supra note 2, s. 118.1(3).

148

See ibid., s. 117(2), as indexed by s. 117.1, which defines basic federal tax payable as 16 per cent
of taxable income up to $31,677; 22 per cent of taxable income between $31,678 and $63,354, 26 per
cent of taxable income between $63,355 and $103,000; and 29 per cent of taxable income exceeding
$103,000.
149

In Alberta, where a flat-rate income tax of 10 per cent was introduced effective 2001 and
subsequent taxation years, the credit is computed at 10 per cent for the first $200 and 12.75 per cent on
amounts over $200 (Alberta Personal Income Tax Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-30, s. 11(1)). In Quebec, the
credit is computed at a rate of 20 per cent on the first $2,000 claimed in the year, and 24 per cent on
amounts over $2,000 (Taxation Act, R.S.Q. c. I-3, s. 752.0.10.6).
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approximately 25 per cent up to $200 and 45 per cent above this amount.150
Since the credits are non-refundable and non-transferable, however, they
are worthless to individual donors whose incomes are too low to pay any
tax. This problem is alleviated partly by a CCRA administrative practice
allowing an individual to claim charitable donations made by the
individual’s spouse or common-law partner and dependants, regardless of
who actually made the gift.
Like the corporate deduction, the individual credit allows taxpayers
to claim the fair market value of gifts that were made during the year or any
of the five preceding taxation years.151 Also like the corporate deduction,
the aggregate value of gifts that may be claimed in the year is subject to a
limit of 75 per cent of the donor’s income for the year, except for gifts of
cultural property or ecologically sensitive land, or where the gift results in
a taxable capital gain or recaptured depreciation.152 Where an individual
dies, the ceiling is increased to the individual’s income for that year and the
year before death,153 and gifts that cannot be claimed in the year of the
individual’s death may be carried back to be claimed in the previous
taxation year.154
The non-refundable credit was introduced in 1988, at which time
the federal government repealed a general deduction for charitable
contributions that was first enacted in 1930.155 Critics had argued that
providing a larger tax benefit to high-income taxpayers than to low-income
taxpayers was a regressive way to encourage charitable donations, because
it provided a larger tax subsidy to charities favoured by high-income donors
than it did to those preferred by low-income donors.156 Although
acknowledging that equity would favour “a system of tax credits for
charitable donations” so that “[t]he tax concession would ... be related only
to the size of the donation and would not also depend upon the income of
150

The exceptions are Alberta, where the combined rate on amounts exceeding $200 is 41.75 per
cent, and Quebec, where combined rates are 36 per cent on amounts up to $200, 49 per cent on
amounts between $200 and $2,000, and 53 per cent on annual contributions exceeding this amount
(ibid.).
151
152
153
154

Act, supra note 2, s. 118.1(1).
Ibid.
See ibid., s. 118.1(1)(a)(ii) for the definition of “total gifts.”
Ibid., s. 118.1(4).

155

For a brief history of the introduction of this deduction, see Duff, “Charitable Contributions”,
supra note 5 at 408-09.
156

See e.g. Thirsk, supra note 10 (“[u]nder the present system, the price of charitable donations
is significantly cheaper if made by a wealthy donor rather than a poor one. Consequently, the charities
favoured by the rich receive greater encouragement than those patronized by the poor” at 37).
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the taxpayer,”157 the Carter Commission recommended that the deduction
“should be continued” on the grounds that a credit would “tend to stifle
charitable giving by upper income individuals and families.”158
While the Carter Commission did not explain why a reduction in
charitable giving by upper income individuals and families justified an
admittedly inequitable deduction, two arguments might be made. First, if
the price elasticity of charitable giving increases with income, as some
studies have suggested,159 a deduction for charitable donations would be
more efficient than a flat-rate credit, encouraging more charitable gifts than
a credit costing the same amount in terms of foregone revenue.160 Second,
if the kinds of charities that high-income donors tend to prefer (hospitals,
universities, and cultural institutions) produce greater social benefits than
the charities generally favoured by low-income taxpayers (churches and
religious organizations) a deduction would provide a larger indirect subsidy
to “more worthy” organizations than a flat-rate credit costing the same
amount in foregone revenues.161 In response to these arguments, however,
critics of a deduction could point to studies challenging the assumption that

157

Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, supra note 33 at 222.

158

Ibid. This argument necessarily assumes that the rate or rates for the credit would be less than
the top marginal rate.
159

See e.g. Henry Aaron, “Federal Encouragement of Private Giving” in Tax Impacts on
Philanthropy, supra note 22 at 210. For a brief explanation of the “price elasticity of giving,” see supra
note 48.
160

See e.g. Graham Glenday, Anil K. Gupta & Henry Pawlak, “Tax Incentives for Personal
Charitable Contributions” (1986) 68 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 688 (estimating that a revenue-neutral tax
credit of 29 per cent would cause aggregate donations to fall by $10 million, while a high-rate credit of
50 per cent would increase aggregate donations by only $6 million at a cost in terms of foregone revenue
of $422 million at 692).
161

See e.g. Faye L. Woodman, “The Tax Treatment of Charities and Charitable Donations Since
the Carter Commission: Past Reforms and Present Problems” (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537
(“Simply, an argument may be made that some institutions are richer contributors to the social, cultural,
and intellectual mosaic than others. Hence, it may be possible to justify a system of deduction that is
skewed in the direction of the favourite charities of upper-income taxpayers” at 575). For studies
suggesting that high-income donors tend to give more to hospitals, universities, and cultural institutions,
while low-income donors favour churches and religious organizations, see Taussig, supra note 38;
Martin Feldstein, “The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part II—The Impact on Religious,
Educational and Other Organizations” (1975) 28 Nat’l Tax J. 209; and Kitchen & Dalton, supra note
52. For a “somewhat less elitist” version of this argument, see Simon, supra note 64 (suggesting that
“whether or not wealthy givers are better suited to uphold cultural and intellectual standards, affluent
individuals are more likely to be idiosyncratic or unorthodox” and contending that this “idiosyncracy
and heterodoxy” might justify “the inegalitarian charitable deduction in the name of pluralism” at 69).
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the price elasticity of charitable giving increases with income,162 questioning
whether the kinds of charities favoured by high-income donors do in fact
provide more public benefits than those preferred by low-income donors,163
and contending that any decision to favour donations to some charities over
donations to others should be explicit, rather than obscured in the form of
a deduction.164
Weighing the pros and cons of deductions and credits, the federal
government opted, as mentioned above, to repeal the deduction for
individual charitable contributions effective for 1988 and subsequent
taxation years, introducing in its place a credit that would “increase fairness
by basing tax assistance on the amount given, regardless of the income level
of the donor.”165 In order to “maintain a substantial incentive for charitable
giving”166 without significantly increasing the cost of the incentive in terms
of foregone revenues, the credit was set at the lowest marginal rate of tax
on charitable donations claimed up to $250, and the highest marginal rate
of tax on amounts exceeding this threshold. In 1994, the $250 threshold was
lowered to $200.167
Although promoted as a fairer incentive for charitable
contributions, which would provide an “equal reward for effort in giving by

162

See e.g. Michael J. Boskin & Martin Feldstein, “Effects of the Charitable Deductions on
Contributions by Low Income and Middle Income Households: Evidence from the National Survey of
Philanthropy” (1978) 59 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 351; and Yong S. Choe & Jinook Jeong, “Charitable
Contributions by Low- and Middle-Income Taxpayers: Further Evidence with a New Method” (1993)
46 Nat’l Tax J. 33.
163

See e.g. Scharf, Cherniavsky & Hogg, supra note 39 (“[a]vailable evidence … seems to suggest
that the activities of the nonprofit organizations and charities typically supported by the rich do not
produce higher valued externalities than do those supported by lower income earners. In fact, the
converse may be true: universities and cultural organizations are charities that may be viewed as more
“local” than churches and religious organizations. Thus larger giving by high income earners should be
discouraged on efficiency grounds, while smaller gifts by low income earners should be encouraged”
at 28); and Duff, “Charitable Contributions”, supra note 5 (“[i]n a pluralistic society … who is to say that
the public benefits associated with religious activities are any less than those associated with higher
education?” at 435).
164

See e.g. Wolkoff, supra note 51 (“if some institutions are to be favored over others, the decision
should be made democratically” at 291); and Brooks, Financing the Voluntary Sector, supra note 28 (“[i]f
certain activities are to be favoured over others, that choice should be clearly reflected on the face of
the instrument chosen”at 26).
165

Hon. Michael Wilson, Tax Reform 1987: White Paper (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
1987) at 32.
166
167

Ibid.
Act, supra note 2 as am. by Income Tax, S.C. 1995, c. 3, s. 34.
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donors in all income brackets,”168 empirical analysis suggests that the credit
continues to provide a greater tax benefit to high-income donors than lowincome donors. As Table 1 illustrates, since average contributions by lowincome taxpayers are either less than or not much greater than the $200
threshold, while average contributions by high-income taxpayers greatly
exceed the $200 threshold, a significant proportion of charitable donations
by low-income taxpayers are creditable at the lowest marginal rate, whereas
most charitable contributions by high-income taxpayers are creditable at
the highest marginal rate. In 1999, for example, the average rate of the
credit for charitable contributions was 23.6 per cent for donors with
incomes less than $10,000 compared to 28.8 per cent for donors with
incomes exceeding $250,000. Since the credit is not refundable, moreover,
it provides no support for charitable giving by taxpayers whose incomes are
too low to pay any tax. As a result, as one commentator has suggested, the
two-tier credit is properly regarded as “a deduction masquerading as a
credit.”169
Table 1: Average Federal Charitable Tax Credit Rates by Income Class
(1999) 170
AVERAGE
INCOME
AVERAGE
AVERAGE
CLASS ($)
DONATION FOR
FEDERAL
FEDERAL
TAXFILERS
CHARITABLE TAX
CHARITABLE TAX
CLAIMING
CREDIT ($)
CREDIT RATE (%)
DONATIONS ($)
Loss or Nil
0
0
0
1 – 10,000
218
51
23.6
10,000 520
135
26.0
30,000

168

Department of Finance, Supplementary Information Relating to Tax Reform Measures, (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 1987) at 10.
169
170

Bromley, supra note 35 at 9.

“Average Donation for Taxfilers Claiming Donations” calculated as the aggregate of charitable
donations, government gifts, cultural gifts, and ecological gifts reported by taxfilers in the income
category, divided by the number of taxfilers in the income category claiming the charitable donations
credit. “Average Federal Charitable Tax Credit” calculated as the aggregate value of tax credits received
by taxfilers in the income category, divided by the number of taxfilers in the income category claiming
the charitable donations credit. “Average Federal Charitable Tax Credit Rate” calculated as the
aggregate value of tax credits received by taxfilers in the income category, divided by the aggregate value
charitable donations, government gifts, cultural gifts, and ecological gifts reported by taxfilers in the
income category.
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30,000 -

680

182

26.7

60,000 -

1,200

327

27.2

100,000 -

2,300

646

28.3

Over 250,000

14,670

4,232

28.8

Source:

Income

Statistics

2001:

1999

Tax

Year,

online:

CCRA,

<http://www.ccra-

adrc.gc.ca/tax/individuals/stats/gb99/pst/interim/pdf/table2-e.pdf>.

In addition, as Table 2 illustrates, since taxpayers with higher
incomes are both more likely to make charitable gifts than low-income
taxpayers and able to make larger donations, the credit provides a much
larger indirect subsidy to charities favoured by high-income taxpayers than
those selected by low-income taxpayers. In 1999, for example, the 21.7 per
cent of taxfilers with incomes between $10,000 and $30,000 received only
0.5 per cent of the total charitable tax credits claimed, while the 0.4 per cent
of taxfilers with incomes exceeding $250,000 received almost 20 per cent of
these credits. As the tax expenditure resulting from the individual
charitable donations credit was estimated at $1.35 billion in 1999,171 these
figures suggest that taxpayers reporting incomes over $250,000 in that year
obtained an aggregate tax benefit from the charitable contributions credit
of approximately $260 million.
Table 2: Distribution by Income Class of Taxfilers, Charitable Donations
Claimed, and Tax Credits (1999)
INCOME
PERCENTAG
PERCENTAG
PERCENTAG
E OF TAXFILERS
E OF TAXFILERS IN
E OF AGGREGATE
CLASS ($)
CLASS CLAIMING
CHARITABLE TAX
CHARITABLE
CREDITS CLAIMED
CONTRIBUTIONS
Loss or Nil
3.8
0
0
1 – 10,000
21.7
2.6
0.5
10,000 39.6
20.9
18.1
30,000

171

Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures, supra note 66 at Table 1. This figure is projected to
remain the same in 2000, to decrease to $1.335 billion in the year 2001, and to increase thereafter to
$1.36 billion in 2002, $1.385 billion in 2003, and $1.41 billion in 2003.
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30,000 -

25.8

39.7

30.1

60,000 -

6.7

51.1

18.1

100,000 –

1.9

68.4

13.6

Over 250,000

0.4

74.3

19.6

Source: Income Statistics 2001: 1999 Tax Year, online:

CCRA,

<http://www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/

tax/individuals/stats/gb99/pst/interim/pdf/table2-e.pdf>.

3.

Capital Gains Exemptions for Gifts of Appreciated Property

Where an individual or corporation makes a gift of property that
has appreciated in value, the taxpayer is deemed to have disposed of the
property for proceeds equal to its fair market value, thereby triggering tax
on the accrued gain.172 Where the property is capital property, held for
investment purposes or personal use, only half the gain is included in
computing the taxpayer’s income,173 reducing the effective tax rate on these
gains to half the rate otherwise applicable. Where the capital property is
qualifying cultural property, however, the Act exempts any capital gain on
the disposition of the property to a designated institution or public
authority, irrespective of whether the property is disposed of by way of a
gift or a sale.174 Where the capital property is a publicly traded security that
is donated to a qualified donee other than a private foundation, or
ecologically sensitive land that is donated to the federal government or a
province or to a registered charity other than a private foundation “one of
the main purposes of which is … the conservation and protection of
Canada’s heritage,” the Act reduces the percentage of the gain included in
computing the taxpayer’s income from one-half to one-quarter.175
The incentive for gifts or sales of cultural property was enacted in
1977,176 and is designed to facilitate the preservation of these cultural
properties in Canada by encouraging their transfer to institutions or public
172

See Act, supra note 2, s. 69(1)(b), which applies to gifts inter vivos, and s. 70(5), which applies
to capital property transferred at death.
173
174
175
176

Ibid., s. 38(a).
Ibid., s. 39(1)(a)(i.1).
Ibid., ss. 38(a.1) and (a.2).

Cultural Property Export and Import Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 50, s. 48, proclaimed in force on
September 6, 1977.
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authorities designated under the Cultural Property Export and Import Act.177
According to subsection 11(1) of this statute, qualifying cultural property
includes: (1) objects “of outstanding significance” by reason of their “close
association with Canadian history or national life,” their “aesthetic
qualities,” or their “value in the study of the arts or sciences”; and (2)
objects “of such a degree of national importance” that their “loss to Canada
would significantly diminish the national heritage.” The determination that
a property is qualifying cultural property is made by the Canadian Cultural
Property Export Review Board, established under the authority of the same
statute.178 The tax expenditure resulting from this incentive was estimated
at $11 million in 1998 and $16 million in 1999.179
The incentive for gifts of ecologically sensitive land was introduced
in 2000180 and is designed to further “[t]he protection of Canada’s natural
heritage, and especially its species at risk” by “providing assistance to
encourage Canadians to take voluntary action to protect species and to
make responsible stewardship an easy choice.”181 Like the exemption for
transfers of cultural property, this incentive reflects a policy decision that
gifts of this kind are of sufficient national importance that they merit a
larger measure of tax assistance. Because the provision was introduced only
recently, estimates of the resulting tax expenditure are not currently
available.182
The incentive for gifts of publicly traded securities was introduced
in 1997 and originally applied only to gifts made after February 18, 1997
and before 2002.183 According to supplementary information released with
the 1997 Federal Budget, this provision was enacted in order to “facilitate
the transfer of appreciated capital property to charities to help them
177
178

Supra note 4, s. 32(2).
Ibid., s. 11.

179

Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures, supra note 66 at Table 1. The estimated cost of this
provision was projected to drop to $14 million for 2000 and $10 million thereafter.
180

Act, supra note 2 as am. by S.C. 2001, c. 17, s. 22(3).

181

Department of Finance, Tax Measures: Supplementary Information (Ottawa: Department of
Finance, 2000) [Department of Finance, Tax Measures].
182

In its most recent tax expenditure analysis, however, the Department of Finance includes the
cost of this measure together with its estimate for the cost of the reduced inclusion rate for donations
of publicly traded shares. For 2001 and subsequent taxation years, the combined cost of these tax
expenditures is estimated at $12 million (Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures, supra note 66 at
Table 1).
183

Act, supra note 2 as am. by S.C. 1998, c. 19, s. 6. For more detailed analyses of this provision,
see “Policy Forum: Comments on the Department of Finance’s ‘Special Federal Tax Assistance for
Charitable Donations of Publicly Traded Securities’” (2003) 51 Can. Tax J. 902.
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respond to the needs of Canadians.”184 In a special release issued on
October 12, 2001, the Minister of Finance announced that the incentive was
“an effective additional incentive for people to make donations to
charities,” and would be made permanent.185 While the incentives for
cultural property and ecologically sensitive land are intended to provide a
larger tax subsidy for gifts producing a greater public benefit, the incentive
for gifts of publicly traded securities is merely intended to increase
aggregate donations irrespective of the charitable activities that these
donations support. Assuming that donations of capital property are more
responsive to the after-tax cost of charitable giving than contributions out
of annual income,186 this measure might be expected to increase aggregate
charitable donations at less cost in terms of foregone revenue than other
tax incentives such as an increase in the rate of the credit. Although it is
difficult to determine whether this incentive has increased aggregate
donations, or merely induced donors to substitute gifts of publicly traded
securities for other gifts, data assembled by the federal Department of
Finance indicate that the number of donors claiming this partial exemption
increased from roughly 500 in 1997 to 2,400 in 2000, and that aggregate
gifts of publicly traded securities increased from $69.1 million in 1997 to
$200.3 million in 2000.187 The tax expenditure resulting from this incentive
was estimated at $6 million in 1997 and 1998 and $13 million in 1999 and
projected to increase to $15 million in 2000, decreasing thereafter to $12
million from 2001 to 2004.188
However effective these additional tax incentives may be as
methods of either encouraging charitable donations or subsidizing gifts with
substantial public benefits, there are two reasons to question the design of
these incentives as full or partial exemptions from capital gains tax
184

Department of Finance, Tax Measures, supra note 181.

185

Canada, Department of Finance, News Release, “Special Federal Tax Assistance for
Charitable Donations of Publicly Traded Securities Made Permanent” (12 October 2001) [Department
of Finance News Release].
186

See Duff, “Charitable Contributions”, supra note 5 (noting that “empirical studies do not
appear to have confirmed the result” at 432).
187

Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures, supra note 66 at 64. According to this study,
donations of publicly traded securities were disproportionately made to large charities and to
educational institutions. The latter conclusion is consistent with empirical studies indicating that affluent
donors are more likely to make charitable gifts to educational institutions.
188

Ibid. at Table 1. For 2000 and subsequent taxation years, estimates include both the tax
expenditure for gifts of publicly traded securities and the incentive for donations of ecologically sensitive
land. See Department of Finance News Release, supra note 185. These estimates reflect only the cost
of the lower inclusion rate, not the further cost associated with the charitable contributions credit itself.
See ibid. at 68 (Table 7) for estimates of the associated cost of the charitable contributions credit.
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otherwise payable on gifts of appreciated property. First, as William
Andrews has observed, the additional “subsidy or artificial inducement” to
charitable giving from this approach is both arbitrary and inequitable, since
“[t]he magnitude of the subsidy is a function of the amount of unrealized
appreciation in relation to the basis of the property and the taxpayer’s rates
of tax, being the greatest for taxpayers in highest brackets and with the most
appreciation.”189
Second, as Richard Goode explains, this approach “tempts some
donors to place excessive values on their gifts, occasionally with the
collusion of recipient institutions.”190 Although the incentive for publicly
traded securities appears to avoid this objection, since the fair market value
of these securities is readily determinable, the incentive for gifts of cultural
property was notoriously susceptible to this abuse until the enactment of
subsection 118.1(10) of the Act in 1990 authorizing the Canadian Cultural
Property Export Review Board to determine the fair market value of gifts
of cultural property.191 In order to prevent this kind of abuse with gifts of
ecologically sensitive land, the Act requires the Minister of the
Environment to determine the fair market value of these gifts.192
Finally, the fact that the main beneficiaries of the incentive for
publicly traded securities are almost certain to be among the most affluent
donors raises a concern about the effect on philanthropic pluralism.
Although the Department of Finance does not appear to have collected
data on the distribution of this tax incentive by income group,193 data on the
distribution by income class of charitable donations claimed in 1996 and
2000 are suggestive. As Table 3 illustrates, while the percentage of
aggregate charitable contributions claimed by donors with incomes
exceeding $250,000 was 11.4 per cent in 1996, before the incentive was
introduced, this proportion increased to 21.0 per cent in 2000, the year
before the incentive was made permanent. In addition, since the value of
the incentive increases with the donor’s income, the effect of the incentive
is to provide a larger indirect subsidy to the kinds of charities favoured by
high-income donors. Indeed, educational institutions appear to have been
major beneficiaries of this incentive.194
189
190
191
192

Supra note 14 at 372. For a similar critique see Rabin, supra note 23 at 926.
Supra note 10 at 167.
See discussion in supra note 118.
Act, supra note 2, s. 118.1(12).

193

Interview of Bill Murphy, Personal Income Tax Division, Department of Finance (17 October
2001) by telephone.
194

See Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures, supra note 66 at 64.
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Table 3: Distribution of Taxfilers and Charitable Donations
Claimed by Income Class (1996, 2000)
INCOME
PERCENTAG
PER
PERCENTAG
PER
CENTAGE OF E OF CHARITABLE
CENTAGE OF E OF CHARITABLE
CLASS ($)
TAXFILERS
DONATIONS
TAXFILERS
DONATIONS
(1996)
CLAIMED (1996)
(2000)
CLAIMED (2000)
Loss and
4.2
0
3.6
0
Nil
1–
23.1
0.8
20.7
0.4
10,000
10,000 –
40.9
23.7
38.8
18.2
30,000
30,000 –
24.5
35.6
26.0
29.6
60,000
60,000 –
5.7
17.3
8.2
17.6
100,000
100,000
1.4
11.1
2.2
13.5
– 250,000
over
0.3
11.4
0.5
21.0
250,000
Source:

CCRA,

Taxation Statistics on Individuals: 1996 Tax Year, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and

Services, 1998); and Income Statistics 2002: 2000 Tax Year, online:

CCRA,

<http://www.ccra-

adrc.gc.ca/tax/individuals/stats/gb00/pst/interim/pdf/table2-e.pdf>.

IV.

REFORM: RESTRUCTURING TAX INCENTIVES FOR
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS

Specific recommendations for reforms to the current statutory
scheme governing the tax treatment of charitable contributions in Canada
can be divided into three catagories: the kinds of recipients donations to
which should qualify for a tax incentive, the kinds of contributions for which
the incentive should be available, and the structure of the tax benefit
provided to indirectly subsidize eligible recipients by encouraging qualifying
contributions. This Part outlines the main conclusions arising from the
above analysis.
A.

Eligible Recipients

Judicial decisions demonstrate the Canadian courts’ unwillingness
to expand the scope of recognized charitable purposes and activities beyond
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the traditional categories acknowledged by the common law of charitable
trusts. While the fourth Pemsel category of “other purposes beneficial to
the community” might have permitted such an expansion, the incremental
approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Vancouver Society
appears to have foreclosed this possibility. To the extent that a tax incentive
for charitable contributions is intended to provide an indirect subsidy to
charitable organizations providing goods and services of public benefit, this
outcome is unfortunate. For this and other reasons, including the
administrative uncertainty involved in determining charitable status under
the common-law definition, it would be desirable to adopt a statutory
definition of charitable purposes and activities.
While such a definition might build upon the Pemsel categories or
the list of charitable activities mentioned in the Statute of Elizabeth, it
should expand upon these sources in two significant ways. First, since the
provision of public benefits is the best rationale for the tax incentive, the
statutory definition should make the concept of a public benefit the
touchstone for eligibility. Second, to the extent that social and cultural
pluralism is itself regarded as a public benefit, the statutory concept should
reject the political purposes doctrine and the common law concept of
religion, and recognize a public benefit in the advancement of alternative
belief systems, both spiritual and ideological, provided that these do not
contradict the values of a free and democratic society.
B.

Qualifying Contributions

Since the purpose of the tax incentive is to provide an indirect
subsidy to charitable organizations providing goods and services of public
benefit, contributions to eligible recipients should qualify for tax assistance
whenever they confer an economic benefit on the recipient regardless of
the motivations of the donor. From this perspective, the key criterion is
neither the voluntariness of the transfer nor the existence of any
consideration in return, but the difference between the value of the
contribution and the value of any consideration received in return. While
the civil law meaning of a gift is compatible with this approach, the common
law concept is needlessly restrictive.
For this reason, and because the Act should ensure uniform
treatment for charitable contributions in all Canadian provinces, it would
be desirable to adopt a statutory definition of a “qualifying contribution”
based on the economic substance of a transaction to confer an economic
benefit on the recipient, rather than the legal form of the contribution as
a “gift” under civil or common law. In addition, since the incentive is
intended to subsidize the provision of public benefits by charitable
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organizations, the concept of a qualifying contribution should apply to
contributions of services as well as property.
C.

Tax Benefit

A tax incentive for charitable contributions is a pluralistic way of
subsidizing charitable organizations, enabling donors to direct public
subsidies to activities of their choosing by “voting” with their contributions.
From this perspective it would be inequitable to weigh these votes
differently according to any characteristic personal to the donor, such as the
donor’s level of income, and inappropriate in most circumstances to bias
this choice by providing larger incentives for contributions to some
activities than others. Where a policy decision is made to favour some
activities over others, however, this differentiation should be transparent
and equally available to all potential donors. To the extent that the
incentive is intended to promote social and cultural pluralism it should limit
the extent to which any one donor can direct public funds and place a
greater emphasis on the number of donors than the size of their donations.
From this perspective, there are several flaws with the structure of
the tax benefits for charitable contributions provided by the Act. First,
although the value of the individual tax credit does not explicitly vary with
the donor’s income, the two-tier structure functions much like a deduction,
providing a larger amount of tax assistance to charitable contributions by
high-income donors who are able to make larger donations than it does to
low-income donors who cannot afford to contribute as much, and providing
no assistance to donors whose incomes are too low to pay any tax. The
additional incentives for gifts of cultural property, publicly traded securities,
and ecologically sensitive land are even more inequitable, since the amount
of the tax benefit depends not only on the donor’s income but also on
whether the donor happens to hold qualifying property that has appreciated
in value. Nor is the deduction for corporate donations any better, since the
amount of the tax benefit varies according to the kind and amount of
income earned. For each of these incentives, therefore, the current rules
weigh donors’ votes differently, favouring contributions by high-income
individuals, and larger and more profitable corporations. The current rules
also fail to moderate inequalities in the number of votes that donors can
exercise in order to direct public funds, since annual limits on allowable
contributions have risen over the years to 75 per cent or more of the
donor’s income, and contributions that are made for the purpose of
producing income are fully deductible without any limit.
Instead, equity and pluralism would be better served first, by
disallowing deductions for charitable contributions made for the purpose
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of earning income and repealing the deduction for corporate donations;
second, by making the individual tax credit a refundable credit with
declining rates based on the amount claimed in the year; and third, by
replacing the special incentives for gifts of cultural property and
ecologically sensitive land with a higher-rate refundable credit for these
kinds of gifts, and repealing the partial exemption for gifts of publicly
traded securities.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although a tax deduction for charitable contributions may be
justified where donations are made for the purpose of gaining or producing
income, this article has argued that additional tax recognition for charitable
contributions is warranted only as a method of indirectly subsidizing the
quasi-public goods and services that are provided by charitable
organizations and promoting the social and cultural pluralism that these
organizations advance. From this perspective, Canada’s current tax rules
are deficient in several respects and should be reformed along the lines
suggested in Part IV.

